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INTRODUCTION
The standard for patentability, codified as the "obviousness"
standard,1 holds that an invention is not patentable if it "would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art .... ,2 People, however,
have different opinions on what is "obvious," on what is
"innovative," and subjectivity has proven impossible to remove
from the process. In the 150-year history of the standard, courts
have articulated a variety of tests to determine obviousness, all
to no avail. 3 The Supreme Court's most recent effort, after
deriding the prevailing test in the lower courts for the last
Nonobviousness is not the only requirement for a valid patent. For example, a
patent must be within the statutory class of patentable subject-matter.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); see Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) ("Excluded
from such patent protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas."). A patent must also describe the invention in sufficient detail to enable
others to practice it. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). Nevertheless, nonobviousness has been
frequently recognized as the "ultimate condition of patentability." See
NONOBVIOUSNESS-THE ULTIMATE -CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (John F.
Witherspoon ed., 1980); Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent
Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 805, 812 (1988).
2 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (Supp. IV 2004).
3 Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 151
(1950) ("[T]he profession [has come] to employ the term 'combination' to imply
[innovation's] presence and the term 'aggregation' to signify its absence .... [T]heir
employment as tests to determine invention results in nothing but confusion."); see,
e.g., Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976) ("new or different function"
test); Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941) ("flash of
creative genius" test).
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twenty years as "gobbledygook,"4 managed to replace it only with
the admonition that the test for obviousness is "flexible.
' 5
The confusion springs partly from the fact that the
obviousness inquiry as framed misses the point. What matters to
society is not whether an invention is obvious or innovative per
se. Most people would agree that a Rube Goldberg machine is
difficult to create, innovative, and not obvious-but it creates no
benefit for society. What matters to society is whether allowing a
patent for a particular invention brings more innovation benefits
to society than the patent costs. 6 And unlike debates about
whether an invention is obvious or innovative to a hypothetical
person, economic benefits and costs can be objectively measured.
As such, patentability can and should be determined by
balancing the costs and benefits of making a patent available for
a particular invention. This Article outlines the assessment of
these costs and benefits.
In assessing the benefits of a patent, courts and
commentators often casually speak of patents as providing
incentives to "create" inventions.7 It is important to emphasize
that the social benefit of patents is not the creation of inventions
as such. Virtually every invention will be created sooner or later.
The true benefit of a patent system is that it speeds up the
inventive process, that is, patent incentives accelerate inventions.
If the cure for AIDS would have taken 100 years to develop
without the prospect of a patent, we hope that by offering a
4 Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct.
1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350).
5 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739 (2007).
6 See Roberts v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 723 F.2d 1324, 1345-46 (7th Cir. 1983)
(en banc) (Posner, J., dissenting) ("[T]he costs as well as benefits of patent protection
are relevant to deciding which inventions should be patentable. The balance tips
against protection when the invention is the sort that was likely to be made, and as
soon, even if no one could have patented it."); ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY,
PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 614 (4th ed.) ("if an idea is so
obvious that people in the field would develop it without much effort .... granting
the patent will have social costs . . . without necessarily having any social
benefit...."); see also John H. Barton, Non-Obviousness, 43 IDEA 475, 491-94
(2003) (discussing some general cost-benefit principles regarding obviousness).
7 See, e.g., A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness: Invention Protection in the
Twenty-First Century, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (1989) ("[A] patent system
produces a net benefit to society provided patents are granted only for those
inventions induced by the patent system. These 'patent-induced' inventions are ones
that would not have been made but for the availability of patents.").
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patent and the prospect of monopoly profits, the cure will be
developed in, say, 10 years. More specifically still, the benefit is
not only that we receive the invention earlier, it is also that we
can use the invention during this entire period even though the
invention is under monopoly.8 Paying monopoly prices for 100
years is better than having no cure for 100 years.
It follows that the widespread perception that patents are
socially costly simply due to their conferring a monopoly is also
misguided. Society benefits from inventions even under
monopoly conditions-if society would not otherwise have had
the invention at all. The cost of a patent accrues only when
society could have otherwise had the same invention in perfect
competition without a patent. Stated another way, the patent
system incurs costs only if the invention would have been
independently invented during the life of the patent. Only after
independent invention occurs--or rather, would have occurred-
does the monopoly cost of a patent accrue. This monopoly cost
must then be balanced against the patent's benefits.
An invention should receive a patent if the accrued benefits
before independent invention outweigh the costs after
independent invention. The Supreme Court recently moved
towards this concept, noting that awarding patents "to advances
that would occur in the ordinary course without real innovation
retards progress .... ." As I shall demonstrate, the benefits of
awarding patents correspond to the economic concept of
consumer surplus, and the costs are the difference between the
consumer surplus in monopoly (with the patent) and the
8 The value of use during the patent term is frequently overlooked by the courts,
which often cite only the benefit of using the invention after patent expiration. See,
e.g., Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944)
("[T]he quid pro quo is disclosure of a process or device in sufficient detail to enable
one skilled in the art to practice the invention once the period of the monopoly has
expired...."). But cf. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966) ("Unless and
until a process is refined and developed to this point-where specific benefit exists in
currently available form-there is insufficient justification for permitting an
applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad field." (emphasis added)). This
oversight is unfortunate. As this Article demonstrates, the primary determinant of
whether benefits outweigh costs is use of the invention during the patent term.
9 KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1732 (emphasis added). This "would occur" standard is
important because it moves away from the approach of emphasizing only what is
already known at the time of invention. See, e.g., Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v.
Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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consumer surplus under perfect competition (with independent
invention). Because both are measurable in a given market for a
patented invention, patentability reduces to an objective,
empirical question.
This Article redefines the patentability standard using
economic principles, offering determinable criteria for courts that
have struggled to articulate them. Part I outlines the history of
the struggle to define a standard for patentability, later codified
as the obviousness requirement. Part II discusses the economic
costs and benefits of a patent grant. Part III outlines the test,
including the important criterion of independent invention. Part
IV discusses some complications to the analysis that do not
materially change the test. Finally, Part V suggests some
modifications to current law in light of the considerations
described.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF OBVIOUSNESS
A. From Hotchkiss to Cuno
The early American patent statutes did not have an express
obviousness requirement-all that was required was novelty and
usefulness. 10 Even relatively trivial changes satisfied a bare
novelty standard, causing predictable problems:
The most frivolous and useless alterations in articles in common
use are denominated improvements.... Implements and
utensils, as old as the civilization of man, are daily, by means of
some ingenious artifice, converted into subjects for patents. If
they have usually been made straight, some man of genius will
have them made crooked .... If, from time immemorial, their
form has been circular, some distinguished [artisan] will make
them triangular .... 11
The requirement of some substantial innovation was a
judicial gloss on the bare novelty standard, developing over time.
Although some early cases had hinted at a requirement stricter
than bare novelty, 12 it was Hotchkiss v. Greenwood that finally
10 See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117; Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat.
318; Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.
11 Thompson v. Haight, 23 F. Cas. 1040, 1041 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1826) (No. 13, 957).
12 See Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 431 (1822) ("If [two machines] were the
same in principle, and merely differed in form and proportion," it was not
2008]
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articulated the requirement clearly.13 In Hotchkiss, the patentee
was the inventor of a method of making doorknobs made of clay
or porcelain. The problem was that this method had been used
on metal knobs, and the patentee was left to argue that "the
novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the place
of one made of metal or wood."'14 The Court was not impressed:
[U]nless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old
method... to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by
an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was
an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute
essential elements of every invention. In other words, the
improvement is the work of the skilful mechanic, not that of the
inventor.15
By requiring a "degree of skill and ingenuity,"'16 the Court
established what would be known, for the next hundred years, as
the "invention" requirement.
The revolutionary implications of Hotchkiss were not
appreciated for some time. 17 There were now three requirements
for patentability: novelty, usefulness, and inventiveness. 18 The
inventiveness requirement, however, proved difficult to define in
any positive sense. All the Court could issue was a series of
pronouncements of what would not be inventive and thus was not
patentable.
patentable. (emphasis added)); Hovey v. Stevens, 12 F. Cas. 609, 612 (C.C.D. Mass.
1846) (No. 6,745); Davis v. Palmer, 7 F. Cas. 154, 159 (C.C.D. Va. 1827) (No. 3,645)
("If, by changing the form and proportion, a new effect is produced, there is not
simply a change of form and proportion, but a change of principle also."). These cases
relied in part on a provision from the 1793 statute-something of a forerunner to the
obviousness standard-stating that "simply changing the form or the proportions of
any machine, or composition of matter, in any degree, shall not be deemed a
discovery." Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318.
13 52 U.S. 248, 261 (1850).
14 Id. at 265.
15 Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
16 Id.
17 See Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for
Patents, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 293, 303-327 (1966) (summarizing the history).
18 Thompson v. Boisselier, 114 U.S. 1, 11 (1885).
[I]t is not enough that a thing shall be new, in the sense that in the shape
or form in which it is produced it shall not have been before known, and
that it shall be useful, but it must, under the constitution and the statute,
amount to an invention or discovery.
[Vol. 82:39
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Following Hotchkiss, the Court had little difficulty in
establishing the principle that "use of one material instead of
another in constructing a known machine is, in most cases, so
obviously a matter of mere mechanical judgment, and not of
invention, that it cannot be called an invention."'19 Similarly, the
Court held that "change[s] of form, proportions, or degree, or the
substitution of equivalents, doing the same thing as the original
invention by substantially the same means, is not such an
invention as will sustain a patent, even though the changes of
the kind may produce better results."20 The Court also declared
that "application by the patentee of an old process to a new
subject, without any exercise of the inventive faculty, and
without the development of any idea which can be deemed new or
original in the sense of the patent law" would not be patentable.
21
Finally, the Court established the principle that the "mere
aggregation of separate devices, each of which performs the
function for which, when used separately, it was adapted" was
not patentable, 22 unless the combination produced "a new and
beneficial result, never attained before."23  The "new result,"
however, could not be the "[p]erfection of workmanship, however
much it may increase the convenience, extend the use, or
diminish expense."24
Explaining how an inventive "new result" could do more
than increase convenience, extend useful life, and diminish
expense proved difficult. Eventually, in the 1941 decision Cuno
Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.,25 the Court
decided that the difference between workmanship and
inventiveness was a "flash of creative genius."26  This
unfortunate phrase caused endless confusion in the lower courts,
and many suggested that corporate sponsored laboratory
research was essentially unpatentable because such research
necessarily involved multiple scientists and step-by-step
19 Hicks v. Kelsey, 85 U.S. 670, 673 (1873).
20 Dunbar v. Myers, 94 U.S. 187, 199 (1876).
21 Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37, 41 (1875).
22 Stephenson v. Brooklyn Cross-Town R.R. Co., 114 U.S. 149, 157 (1885).
23 Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580, 591 (1881).
24 Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1875).
25 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
26 Id. at 91.
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experimentation with no single "flash" of genius. 27 Finally, in
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment
Corp.,28 the Supreme Court acknowledged that it had not, could
not, and would not articulate a precise test for its inventiveness
requirement:
While this Court has sustained combination patents, it never
has ventured to give a precise and comprehensive definition of
the test to be applied in such cases. The voluminous literature
which the subject has excited discloses no such test.... In
course of time the profession came to employ the term
"combination" to imply its presence and the term "aggregation"
to signify its absence, thus making antonyms in legal art of
words which in ordinary speech are more nearly synonyms.
However useful as words of art to denote in short form that an
assembly of units has failed or has met the examination for
invention, their employment as tests to determine invention
results in nothing but confusion. 29
B. Section 103 and Graham v. John Deere Co.
At the same time that Great Atlantic was pending in the
Supreme Court, efforts for a major reform of patent law were
pending in Congress. This effort included a codification of the
27 See Potts v. Coe, 140 F.2d 470, 472-74 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Picard v. United
Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 636 (2d Cir. 1942) ("Unless we are to mistake for
invention the slow but inevitable progress of an industry through trial and
error... there was no invention in this."); see also William Douglas Sellers, The
Flash of Genius Doctrine Approaches the Patent Office, 7 ENG'G & SCI. MONTHLY 3, 4
(1944) ("If the doctrine of Potts u. Coe is to be recognized and given effect it is
doubtful that many patents owned by corporations having research organizations
are of any validity."). Other courts deemed such a result unacceptable and simply
announced that they would refuse to follow the "flash of genius" test. See Chi. Steel
Foundry Co. v. Burnside Steel Foundry Co., 132 F.2d 812, 817 (7th Cir. 1943).
The test of "flash of genius" has been applied to curtain the field of
patentable discovery and to eliminate from the protection of patents, all
products... which were.., the product of prolonged study and step by step
advance. In short, it would eliminate nearly all the advances of history ....
Id. (emphasis added).
28 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
29 Id. at 150-51; see also id. at 150 & n.5 (noting that the "Index to Legal
Periodicals reveals no less than sixty-four articles relating to combination patents
and the theory and philosophy underlying the patent laws," but the "voluminous
literature which the subject has excited discloses no ... test" for the standard to be
applied).
[Vol. 82:39
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standard of patentability. The first version of what went on to
become 35 U.S.C. § 103 read:
Conditions for patentability, lack of invention
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not
identically disclosed or described in the material specified in
section 22 of this title [which went on to become
35 U.S.C. § 1021, if the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and said material are such that the
subject matter as a whole would be obvious to an ordinary
person skilled in the art.
Patentability as to this condition shall be determined by the
nature of the contribution to the advancement of the art, and
not by the nature of the mental processes by which such
contribution may have been accomplished.
30
This section went through some minor amendments, and was
eventually passed as section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952.31 One
early amendment was to replace the phrase "lack of invention"
with a new "nonobviousness" standard. 32 This was no doubt
motivated, in part, by a hope on the part of some participants in
the legislative process that the codified standard would avoid the
confusing morass of "inventiveness" precedent that had
accumulated since Hotchkiss.33 At the same time, Congress did
not specifically repudiate any prior judicial decisions except
Cuno.34 Section 103, in its final form, read:
30 STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 81ST CONG., PROPOSED REVISION
AND AMENDMENT OF THE PATENT LAWS: PRELIMINARY DRAFT WITH NOTES § 23
(Comm. Print 1950).
31 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1952).
32 Compare STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 81ST CONG., PROPOSED
REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF THE PATENT LAWS: PRELIMINARY DRAFT WITH NOTES
§ 23 (Comm. Print 1950), with H.R. 9133, 81st Cong. § 103 (2d Sess. 1950).
33 See Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the "Invention" Requirement, 1 AM. PAT.
L. ASS'N Q.J. 26 (1972), reprinted in 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 163, 170 (2004) ("The first
policy decision underlying Section 103 was to cut loose altogether from the century-
old term 'invention.' ").
34 The committee report, in commenting on Section 103, made little fanfare of
the shift from "invention" to "nonobviousness." All it said on prior decisions was:
"[Section 103] paraphrases language which has often been used in decisions of the
courts, and the section is added to the statute for uniformity and definiteness. This
20081
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Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of
this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to
be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which
said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made. 35
The Supreme Court first interpreted the new, codified,
obviousness standard in Graham v. John Deere Co. 36  The
Graham Court first reaffirmed that the newly enacted section
103 was a mere codification of the prior law dating from
Hotchkiss,37 save for the legislative overruling of the "flash of
genius" test.35 Surveying its prior cases, the Court recounted:
"[A]s this Court has observed, '(t)he truth is, the word
("invention") cannot be defined in such manner as to afford any
substantial aid in determining whether a particular device
involves an exercise of the inventive faculty or not.'"39 The Court
then proceeded to lay down a new approach to determining
patentability:
The Hotchkiss formulation, however, lies not in any label, but in
its functional approach to questions of patentability. In
practice, Hotchkiss has required a comparison between the
subject matter of the patent, or patent application, and the
background skill of the calling. It has been from this
comparison that patentability was in each case determined. 40
section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have
appeared in some cases." S. REP. No. 82-1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2394, 2400.
35 Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 103, 66 Stat. 792. This remains the
statutory standard of obviousness today. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
36 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
37 Id. at 17 ("We conclude that the section was intended merely as a codification
of judicial precedents embracing the Hotchkiss condition ... ").
38 See id. at 15-16 & n.7 (repudiating the flash of genius test).
39 Id. at 11-12 (quoting McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891)).
40 Id. at 12.
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According to the Court, obviousness could be determined
using a simple four step analysis. First, "the scope and content of
the prior art are to be determined. '41 Second, the "differences
between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be
ascertained."42 Third, "the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent
art [is to be] resolved."43 Finally, "[a]gainst this background, the
obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is
determined."44
The Graham formulation gave some structure to the
obviousness inquiry. The Court's opinion, however, provided
little insight into how, against the background facts, "the
obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter" was to be
determined. The opinion gave all the appearance of expecting a
solution to appear out of thin air once the formula was followed.
45
The lack of an articulable rule meant that determinations of
obviousness took the appearance-and arguably the reality-of
resting on judicial whim, where the validity of a patent was
heavily dependent on the court that was deciding the case,46 a
41 Id. at 17.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 In a grudging and opaque concession to the reality that the inquiry was
ultimately a subjective one, the Court acknowledged that: "What is obvious is not a
question upon which there is likely to be uniformity of thought in every given factual
context." Id. The court nonetheless expressed confidence that "strict observance of
the requirements laid down here will result in that uniformity and definiteness
which Congress called for in the 1952 Act." Id. This confidence was soon proven
wrong.
46 A Commission reported to Congress in 1975 that patent validity
determinations were perceived to be strongly dependent on whether one appears
before a favorable judge: "Nowhere is the quest more vigorously pursued than for the
right forum to rule on validity. Patentees now scramble to get into the 5th, 6th and
7th Circuits since the courts there are not inhospitable to patents whereas infringers
scramble to get anywhere but in these circuits." Comm'n on Revision of the Fed.
Court Appellate Sys., Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for
Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 370 (1975). The problem of different circuits treating the
same patent differently did not originate with Graham; rather, Graham itself
involved a circuit split in which the Fifth Circuit had upheld the very patent that the
Eighth Circuit later invalidated. Compare Jeoffroy Mfg., Inc. v. Graham, 219 F.2d
511, 520 (5th Cir. 1955), with John Deere Co. v. Graham, 333 F.2d 529 (8th Cir.
1964), affd, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). However, Graham did little to resolve this situation.
20081
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
result that the drafters of section 103 had clearly sought to
avoid. 47
C. The Teaching-Suggestion-Motivation Test
Partly in response to the widespread perception that the
validity of a patent was mostly dependent on the forum of its
adjudication, 48 Congress created the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in 1982 and vested in that court exclusive
jurisdiction over patent-related appeals from both the patent
office and district courts.49 With the creation of the Federal
Circuit, the Supreme Court largely withdrew from the field of
patent law.50 The Court did not decide a single case substantially
47 See S. REP. No. 82-1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2400
(noting that section 103 was intended to promote "uniformity and definiteness" and
"have a stabilizing effect" on the law).
48 See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 22 (1981) ("At present, the validity of a patent is
too dependant upon geography (i.e., the accident of judicial venue) to make effective
business planning possible."); supra note 46 and accompanying text; see also
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts,
64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1989) (citing Thomas Cooch, The Standard of Invention in the
Courts, in DYNAMICS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 34, 56-59 (William Ball ed., 1960)).
49 See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2000) (appeals from district courts);
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (appeals from the Patent and Trademark Office). But see
Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 834 (2002)
("Not all cases involving a patent-law claim fall within the Federal Circuit's
jurisdiction.").
50 Between 1982 and 2000, the Supreme Court decided eleven cases involving
patents. The cases were: Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999) (standard for
reviewing Patent and Trademark Office actions); Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S.
55 (1998) (standard for on-sale bar); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem.
Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (doctrine of equivalents); Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (interpretation of patent claims); Asgrow
Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995) (scope of the seed saving exemption
under the Plant Variety Protection Act); Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc.,
508 U.S. 83 (1993) (whether an invalidity counterclaim may be dismissed as moot
upon finding non-infringement); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661
(1990) (reviewing the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (preemption of state laws); Christianson v.
Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988) (scope of the Federal Circuit's
patent law jurisdiction); Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809 (1986)
(vacating the Federal Circuit's determination of non-obviousness for failure to
articulate whether deference was given to the trial court); Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648 (1983) (reviewing an award of prejudgment interest). See
generally John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to
the Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273 (2002) (reviewing cases).
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affecting the obviousness doctrine between 1977 and 2006.51
In the absence of Supreme Court intervention, the Federal
Circuit developed its own structure for obviousness analysis. The
first step requires the party challenging patentability to prove a
prima facie case of invalidity.52 If a prima facie case is made, the
patentee can then rebut this case by providing facts supporting
non-obviousness, such as demonstrating unexpected results,
53
that the prior art teaches away from the claimed invention,54 that
the invention proved to be commercially successful, 55 or that
others had attempted and failed to make the invention. 56 When
rebuttal evidence is provided, the prima facie case dissolves and
obviousness is determined in the totality of circumstances as
under Graham.57
The key to this three-step process, however, was always
proving the initial prima facie case because the Federal Circuit
created a difficult evidentiary hurdle. In order to establish a
prima facie case of obviousness, the party challenging
patentability must prove a "teaching," "suggestion," or
"motivation" to modify prior art references into the claimed
invention. 58
The teaching-suggestion-motivation test achieved limited
objectivity, but at a heavy cost. To the extent that the test
required explicit suggestions to combine elements to achieve an
51 Dennison presented the issue of the standard of obviousness. See 475 U.S. at
809-10 ('The [Federal Circuit] ... ruled that the references cited by the District
Court did not teach the innovations introduced by respondent .. "). The Supreme
Court, however, remanded for clarification on whether the Federal Circuit was
giving any deference to the district court's factual findings. Id. at 811. When the case
returned the Court denied certiorari. Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 481 U.S.
1052 (1987).
52 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) (stating that an accused infringer in litigation bears
burden of proving invalidity); In re Kumar, 418 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
("During examination, the examiner bears the initial burden of establishing a prima
facie case of obviousness.").
53 See In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1469-70 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
54 See id. at 1471.
55 See In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
56 See In re Wright, 569 F.2d 1124, 1127 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
57 See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Spada, 911 F.2d
705, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
58 In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc.
v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("[T]eachings of [prior art]
references can be combined only if there is some suggestion or incentive to do so.").
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invention, it was objective. 59 For example, if an invention is the
combination of A and B in a single package, people can disagree
over whether the idea was ingenious or obvious. On the other
hand, if the legal question was transformed to whether there was
a piece of paper that explicitly said, verbatim, "combine A and B
in a single package," the inquiry became purely factual and
objective. The problem with requiring such a degree of
explicitness and specificity, however, is that the obviousness
inquiry reduces to a simple novelty inquiry. It would require the
prior art reference to describe the invention exactly.
To the extent that the patented invention differed from the
prior art's explicit teachings, however, the teaching-suggestion-
motivation test could do very little to help unless it was to
require patent grants for every novel invention. Obviousness, to
have any meaning, involves bridging the difference between the
prior art and the patented invention through something that is
not explicitly in the prior art itself. In a series of decisions after
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in KSR International Co. v.
Teleflex, Inc.,60 the Federal Circuit emphasized that there may be
"implicit motivation" from many sources to provide that bridge. 61
The problem is that once this "implicit motivation" standard is
accepted, the obviousness question lands back in square one; it is
merely a matter of semantics to switch from asking whether
59 Some Federal Circuit cases have suggested that the teaching, suggestion, or
motivation had to be very explicit. See, e.g., Winner Int'l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202
F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("Although a reference need not expressly teach
that the disclosure contained therein should be combined with another, the showing
of combinability, in whatever form, must nevertheless be 'clear and particular.'"
(quoting In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citation omitted)));
Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("A person
of ordinary skill in the art is. .. presumed to be one who thinks along the line of
conventional wisdom in the art .... ").
60 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006) (granting petition for certiorari).
61 DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464
F.3d 1356, 1366-71 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (stating that there existed an implicit
motivation to combine old elements because the resulting combination was "cheaper,
faster, and more convenient"); Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1294-
95 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (stating that implicit motivation could be based on expert
testimony that persons of skill would have expected the invention to work
successfully); Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(asserting that implicit motivation to use one package instead of multiple packages
exists because "of the well-known practice of packaging items in the manner most
convenient to the purchaser").
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substituting a clay doorknob for a metal doorknob was "non-
inventive," to asking whether it was "obvious," to asking whether
it was "implicitly motivated." All of these standards proved to be
masks for subjective opinions, either of experts, 62 judges, 63 or
juries. 64
D. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.
The Supreme Court's decision in KSR International Co. v.
Teleflex Inc.65 substantially adopted the Federal Circuit's
teaching-suggestion-motivation test, but removed the more
bright-line rules that the Federal Circuit had previously laid
down. The Court held that there should be "an apparent reason
to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the
patent at issue" and that "this analysis should be made
explicit."66 The Court also held, however, that "the analysis need
not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject
matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the
inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in
the art would employ."67
The KSR Court quite clearly rejected the strong version of
the teaching-suggestion-motivation test, one that would have
required the prior art to explicitly teach the differences-and one
that would have rendered § 103 dead-letter as there would be no
differences to bridge.68 Ultimately, KSR's holding is rather akin
to the "implicit motivation" standard that the Federal Circuit
had already adopted in response to the Court's grant of
certiorari.69  The problem with this "flexible" approach to
62 See Alza, 464 F.3d at 1294 (permitting implicit motivation to be based on
expert testimony).
63 Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 153-54
(1950) (stating that the "standard of invention" is a question of law).
64 Winner Int'l, 202 F.3d at 1348 ("Whether motivation to combine the
references was shown we hold a question of fact.").
65 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
66 Id. at 1741.
67 Id.
68 Compare Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir.
1985) ("A person of ordinary skill in the art is ... presumed to be one who thinks
along the line of conventional wisdom in the art .. "), with KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1742
("A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an
automaton.").
69 See KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1743 (2007) ("We note the Court of Appeals has since
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obviousness endorsed by the Supreme Court is the same as it has
always been: Whether something is implicitly motivated and
obvious is nothing more than a subjective, inscrutable judgment
call. Judges, juries, and experts will have endless debates on this
matter of opinion; but it cannot be objectively proved.
E. A Summary of Obviousness Law
Judge Giles Rich of the Federal Circuit once described the
pre-codification "invention" standard as the "plaything of the
judiciary [that] meant anything the judges chose to make it
mean."70  The codified standard is unfortunately no different.
The court that decided in 1999 that a pumpkin face on a trash
bag was nonobvious 71 was a very different court from the one
that decided in 2006 that a new method of dyeing textiles that
eliminated two steps in the traditional process was obvious;72 yet
both explicitly purported to be applying the same test. 73 Both the
teaching-suggestion-motivation test and § 103 have proven to be
extremely malleable.
As a brief survey of the history of the obviousness standard
shows, the problem is a lack of objective criteria to determine
obviousness. Although § 103 purports to create an objective test
by referencing a hypothetical person, the subjective opinion of a
hypothetical person is still subjective: Why, exactly, does the
substitution of clay for metal doorknobs not demonstrate
elaborated a broader conception of the TSM test than was applied in the instant
matter." (citing DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick
Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d
1286, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2006))). The Federal Circuit has taken this quote to be
essentially a carte blanche affirmance of the teaching-suggestion-motivation test.
See Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Atphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 2007). Whether the Supreme Court will see KSR as the same ringing
endorsement of the teaching-suggestion-motivation test as the Federal Circuit
remains to be seen.
70 Giles S. Rich, Why and How Section 103 Came to Be, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 181,
186 (2004).
71 See In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
72 See DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co.,
464 F.3d 1356, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
73 The Federal Circuit's insistence that its holding in DyStar was entirely
consistent with its prior cases did not appear convincing to the Supreme Court. See
KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1743 ("We note the Court of Appeals has since elaborated a
broader conception of the TSM test .... ).
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ingenuity?74 Who is to say that such a substitution required less
brilliance than the substitution of carbon for metal filament in
the light bulb?75 And if some expert was to so opine, how could
he be proven wrong? Even when everyone agrees on the precise
difference between clay and metal down to the last atom, people
disagree on the significance of such a difference. With subjective
judgment comes the concern that, in hindsight, everything looks
obvious and insignificant. 76 Because a subjective judgment is
ultimately inscrutable, the hindsight bias cannot be isolated and
removed. 77
The problem of subjectivity in the obviousness standard is
similar to that in the reasonableness standard of tort law.7 8 Like
the obviousness standard, reasonableness references the
hypothetical judgment of a hypothetical person to create
semantic objectivity.7 9 In tort law, courts struggled to give the
standard of a "reasonable and prudent person" useful meaning,
beyond telling jurors that the reasonable person was just like
them and allowing jurors to exercise subjective judgment.80
74 Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 267 (1850).
75 See U.S. Patent No. 223,898 (filed Jan. 27, 1880) (Edison's patent for the light
bulb, claiming "[a]n electric lamp for giving light by incandescence, consisting of a
filament of carbon of high resistance, made as described, and secured to metallic
wires, as set forth.").
76 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966) (noting the need "to
resist the temptation to read into the prior art the teachings of the invention in
issue"); Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580, 591 (1881) ("Now that [the invention] has
succeeded, it may seem very plain to any one that he could have done it as well. This
is often the case with inventions of the greatest merit.").
77 See Gregory Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious II: Experimental Study on the
Hindsight Issue Before the Supreme Court in KSR v. Teleflex, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1,
16 (2007) (discussing hindsight bias in obviousness determinations, and finding that
the teaching-suggestion-motivation test does nothing to mitigate hindsight bias in
jurors).
78 See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(describing the person of ordinary skill as "not unlike the 'reasonable man' and other
ghosts in the law"); see also Graham, 383 U.S. at 18 ('What is obvious is not a
question upon which there is likely to be uniformity of thought in every given factual
context. The difficulties, however, are comparable to those encountered daily by the
courts in such frames of reference as negligence and scienter ....").
79 Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 61 (1949) (stating that the standard for
reasonableness is "what a reasonable and prudent person would have done under
the same circumstances").
8o See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 290 cmt. e (1965).
In general, the actor is required to know everything with respect to the risk
of harm which is a matter of common knowledge in the community in
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What appears reasonable and prudent to one person appears
reckless to another. And the phenomenon that in the hindsight
of an accident everything looks unreasonable remains a widely
recognized problem. 8'
In the tort context, economic thinking led to Learned Hand's
formulation of reasonableness in United States v. Carroll Towing
Co., 82 which stated that "if the probability [of accident] be called
P; the injury, L; and the burden [of avoiding the accident], B;
liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P:
i.e., whether B [<] PL."83 The switch from inherently subjective
notions of "reasonableness" to a mathematical formulation with
determinable (albeit difficult to determine84) variables marked an
important advance that forms the foundation of much of modern
tort scholarship. 85  Similar to the Hand formulation,
patentability can be assessed using a mathematical formulation,
replacing ill-defined and subjective notions of "obviousness,"
"ingenuity," or "implicit motivation" with objective measures of
benefits and costs, as demonstrated below.
which his conduct occurs. There is a close relation between the minimum
standard of knowledge required in negligence cases and those matters of
which a court will take judicial notice because they are generally known.
Id.; cf. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 165-87 (8th ed. 2004)
(discussing the traditional, "common sense, intuitive meaning of negligence" and the
later "judicial effort to impart a more precise economic meaning to the term").
81 See Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post 0 Ex Ante: Determining
Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 99 (1995); Merrie Jo Stallard &
Debra L. Worthington, Reducing the Hindsight Bias Utilizing Attorney Closing
Arguments, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 671, 678-79 (1998); see also Reid Hastie et al.,
Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Hindsight Effects on Judgments of Liability for
Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 597, 609 (1999).
82 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
83 Id. at 173.
84 Hand himself was cognizant of the difficulties in determining the variables to
his formula. See Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949). Hand's own
reservations about his formula have not prevented Law and Economics scholars
from adopting it as a foundation for economic analysis of tort law.
85 See RICHARD A. POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1-9
(1982) ("This casebook is premised on the belief that the Hand formula-more
broadly, economic analysis-provides a unifying perspective in which to view all of
tort law."); EPSTEIN, supra note 80, at 165 ("Although Learned Hand disclaimed the
formulation of any 'general rule' for negligence, his decision in Carroll Towing has
spawned a burgeoning academic literature on the economic interpretation of
negligence and, by implication, the entire tort law.").
[Vol. 82:39
PATENT OBVIOUSNESS
II. THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS
A. The Benefits of Patents
1. The Acceleration Benefit
The traditional theory of intellectual property was that the
rights provided a reward for making investments that "created"
inventions. At the time of the Patent Act of 1952, the economic
debate over patents reflected this "creation" theory. In a report
to Congress surveying the economic literature on patents, Fritz
Machlup wrote:
Are the consumers-the non-patent-owing people-worse off for
[the patent system]?
"No; they are not," says one group of economists. Patents are
granted on inventions which would not have been made in the
absence of a patent system; the inventions make it possible to
produce more or better products than could have been produced
without them ....
"Wrong," says another group of economists. Many of the
inventions for which patents are granted would also be made
and put to use without any patent system. The consumers
could have the fruits of this technical progress without paying
any toll charges. Even if some inventions are made and used
thanks only to the incentives afforded by the patent system,
consumers must pay for all patented inventions ....
This is but one of the fundamental conflicts in the economics of
the patent system.8 6
As the italicized portions demonstrate, the "creation" dispute
rested on a dichotomy. Patent proponents asserted that patents
created inventions whole, opponents asserted that patents
created nothing at all. What both sides ignored was that while
virtually every invention would be created sooner or later even
86 STAFF OF S. SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, & COPYRIGHTS, S. COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 44-
45 (Comm. Print 1958) (emphasis added).
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without a patent system, patents created incentives for
additional research investment, leading to inventions being made
sooner than they otherwise would be.8 7 The patent system
creates no inventions, it accelerates them.
One of the first authors that contributed to this modern
understanding was Yoram Barzel, in his paper Optimal Timing
of Innovations.88 As the title itself suggests, innovation is a
matter of timing, not creation. Barzel suggested that the patent
system created incentives for multiple firms to race for a patent,
affecting the timing of when an invention would be developed.8 9
Implicit in this idea was that patents affected when, not if, an
invention would be created. In response to Barzel, Edmund
Kitch crystallized this concept:
If the purpose is to reward the inventor for his invention, then
why shouldn't he be awarded all of the present value of his
invention? The simplicity of this argument breaks down,
however, if we take the view that the inventor's contribution is
not the invention itself-which eventually would have been made
by someone else-but the time of the invention. The patent
should reward not for the whole value of the invention, but for
the value of being first.90
Kitch, however, did not fully realize the implications of his
theory, believing that the social value of an invention affected the
term-and scope-of the optimal patent but not whether it
87 DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 67 (3d ed. 2004)
("[The inventor's contribution is often not the invention itself-which would have
eventually been invented by someone else-but rather the timing of the invention.
In this case, the patent should not be reward for the entire value of the invention,
but rather for the value of early discovery and disclosure.").
88 Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348,
348 (1968). This insight did not necessarily originate with Barzel, as others
suggested the trade-off between research expenditures and patent rents at almost
the same time. See, e.g., F. M. Scherer, Time-Cost Tradeoffs in Uncertain Empirical
Research Projects, 13 NAVAL RES. LOGISTICS Q. 71 (1966).
89 See Barzel, supra note 88, at 350-51 (discussing the timing of innovation); see
also Jennifer F. Reinganum, The Timing of Innovation: Research, Development, and
Diffusion, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 849, 853-54 (Richard
Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989) ("Invention is a costly activity, with the
cost of invention by any given date being a decreasing convex function of the time
prior to invention.").
90 Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265, 284-85 (1977) (emphasis added).
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should be granted.91 Further, Kitch suggested that the reward of
the patent should be for "the whole value" of being first, or, in
economic terms, the entire surplus during acceleration. 92 What
Kitch ignored in this calculation was the very concern that the
rest of his article was dealing with: the problem of dissipating
producer surplus.93
2. The Problem of Dissipating Surplus
As Barzel demonstrated, the acceleration of an invention in
the patent system is accomplished through the mechanism of the
patent race. 94  A patent race occurs when the prospect of
monopoly rent encourages multiple firms to make the investment
in research; the first to create the invention obtains the patent-
and the losers get nothing. To Barzel and Kitch, the patent race
was a problem because innovation races between multiple firms
led to wasteful duplication of research. 95 Wasteful duplication
would result in the producer surplus from an eventual invention
becoming completely dissipated beforehand. 96
Barzel suggested that a government auction system giving
one firm complete control of an invention "before resources are
committed to the innovating activity" would prevent wasteful
duplication from occurring. 97 Following Barzel's analysis, Kitch
91 Id. at 285 ("This would suggest long patents for 'big jumps' and short patents
for 'little jumps.' ").
92 Id. at 284-85.
93 See John F. Duffy, The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual Property, 71
U. CHI. L. REV. 37, 53 (2004) ("[S]etting the reward equal to the full social surplus of
the invention is clearly not efficient because competition among inventors will [then]
dissipate all of the social surplus.").
94 Barzel, supra note 88, at 348-49 ("[Clompetition between potential
innovators to obtain priority rights (and profits) from innovations can result in
premature applications of discoveries.").
95 Id. at 349 ("[Cjompetition among potential innovators may deprive
innovations of all their special economic value."); see also Samson Vermont,
Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475,
491-92 (2006).
96 D.G. McFetridge & M. Rafiquzzaman, The Scope and Duration of the Patent
Right and the Nature of Research Rivalry, 8 RES. L. & ECON. 91, 93 (1986)
("[Clompetition for a patent will be pushed to the point at which the value of
resources expended by rival inventors is just equal to the expected present
discounted value of the royalty or other income of the patentee.").
97 Barzel, supra note 88, at 352 n.11. Barzel did not address whether multiple
firms would dissipate surplus by competing to win the auction.
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suggested that the patent system could itself grant broad rights
and foreclose later research by rivals, thus itself functioning as
the auction that Barzel had envisioned. 98 Both authors focused
on centralizing rights to the invention as a solution to the
dissipation of rents.99
The difficulty with the centralization approach is that a
broader patent necessarily means even more rents for the
patentee and this pushes rival competitors to accelerate an
invention even harder to secure the patent, resulting in even
more wasteful duplication and rent dissipation.100 The patent
system does not, and probably cannot, grant exclusive control
over an invention sufficiently early to prevent a race between
multiple competitors from dissipating rents. 101
As John Duffy later pointed out, however, patent racing does
not dissipate all the benefits of an invention, but only the
producer surplus.10 2 In the aggregate, "firms will neither gain
nor lose from investing in innovation,"10 3 and thus the multiple
racing firms will spend only their portion of the expected
surplus. 10 4 Society's benefit from the invention is what remains:
the consumer surplus. 10 5 It is not the social surplus, because the
98 Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, supra note 90, at 265-
66.
99 Id. at 276-79.
100 See Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith, Patents, Prospects, and
Economic Surplus: A Comment, 23 J.L. & ECON. 197, 198-201 (1980); see also Aditya
Bamzai, Comment, The Wasteful Duplication Thesis in Natural Monopoly
Regulation, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1525, 1535-38 (2004).
101 See Bamzai, supra note 100, at 1526-34. But see Mark F. Grady & Jay I.
Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305, 316-17 (1992)
(theorizing that if the patent right was granted early enough, the best inventor
would be able to patent first and prevent a patent race from starting).
102 John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
439, 473 (2004) [hereinafter Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents].
103 Id.
104 McFetridge & Rafiquzzaman, supra note 96, at 93.
105 See id. ("When inventive activity is competitive, the transfer of surplus from
users to inventors eliminates the surplus."); see also RICHARD T. RAPP & LAUREN J.
STIROH, NAT'L ECON. RESEARCH Assocs., STANDARD SETTING & MARKET POWER 2,
presented at Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the
Knowledge-Based Economy: J. Hearings Before the U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed.
Trade Comm'n (Apr. 18, 2002), http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/intelpropertycom
ments/nera.pdf ("The value of a new technology, product or product characteristic
can be approximated by the value to consumers of its advantage over the next best
alternative....").
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producer surplus is dissipated. By shifting producer surplus to
consumer surplus, more wealth is preserved from dissipation.106
3. Calculating the Benefit
The benefit of a patent, economically, is the social wealth
that is preserved from dissipation, i.e., the consumer surplus as
demonstrated above. Assume, then, that a patentee conceives an
invention and files for a patent, and that if the patent is granted
today, the invention disclosed would produce a potential total
surplus of $10 in this year and that the surplus grows at 5
percent per year.10 7 Assume that the surplus is evenly divided
between consumers and producers in perfect competition but that
the consumer surplus shrinks to 30 percent under monopoly
conditions, the producer surplus taking 60 percent, leaving a
deadweight loss of 10 percent. Assume finally that any patent on
the invention would issue immediately and would last for twenty
years. Figure 1 would represent consumer surplus, projected
indefinitely:
Figure 1
70 T 4 Potential70 v :: Total Surplus
40
20 .Consumer
Surplus
10
Year
In this hypothetical, the consumer surplus will continue to
grow indefinitely. Although the annual consumer surplus
receives a significant boost at year 2027 when the patent expires,
106 Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, supra note 102, at 473-74.
107 1 am assuming here that the steps of (1) conception by the patentee, (2) filing
the patent application, and (3) granting and publishing the patent, all occur
immediately. In reality, the period between the patentee's conception and the
publishing of the patent may be several years. I discuss the effect of relaxing this
assumption in Part IV.D.
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thus shifting the market to perfect competition, during the period
of monopoly there is still consumer surplus. Under the
assumptions above, the consumer surplus during the patent
term, under monopoly conditions, is $99.20. A monopoly
consumer surplus is better than the alternative: no consumer
surplus at all. 08
The model above is unrealistic because the benefit of a
patented invention will not continue increasing forever. This is
not important; the annual consumer surplus can vary across
time. Indeed, such variations occur not only between years but
also within years. Mathematically, the consumer surplus of an
invention can be stated as a function of time t, B(t). The variable
t can be expressed in any unit of time, whether it be days, weeks,
months, or years; the function would be defined as the consumer
surplus for any particular value of t. The cumulative consumer
surplus over a period is thus the area under the curve, expressed
mathematically as the integral, JB(t).
B. The Costs of Patents
Patents are most frequently criticized for imposing a
monopoly deadweight loss for their entire term; indeed, both
courts and commentators frequently assume that this is the cost
of patents. 10 9 But unless society has some alternative where it
has both the invention and does not pay a deadweight loss, this
"cost" is illusory. If the only alternatives are having the
invention under monopoly and not having the invention at all,
society is unambiguously better off having the invention under
monopoly." 0
108 See infra text accompanying note 110.
109 See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152
(1989) ("The tension between the desire to freely exploit the full potential of our
inventive resources and the need to create an incentive to deploy those resources is
constant."); JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 20 (2003) ("The
introduction of patent rights will result in a reduction in the quantity of widgets
supplied."); Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21
RAND J. ECON. 106, 107 (1990) ("When increasing the length of the patent... there
is a constant tradeoff between the additional reward to the patentee and the
increment to deadweight loss ... ").
110 As one commentator has put it:
A "monopoly" of tea bags is not bad, if the prospect of that "monopoly" was
what induced the tea bag invention. The only product "monopolized" and
sold at too low quantities is a product that would be sold in even lower
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It is only after when the invention would have been
dedicated to the public domain by an independent inventor that
society receives the potential for a third option: having the
invention under perfect competition. The difference in social
welfare between perfect competition and monopoly, when
competition is a potential option, is the cost of a patent.
What are the differences between competition and
monopoly? In standard economics, monopoly is different from
perfect competition in two ways. First, monopoly causes a
deadweight loss.111 Second, monopoly causes a transfer of part of
the consumer surplus to the monopolist producer-the monopoly
rent.112 Ordinarily, economists do not consider wealth transfers
from consumers to producers as a cost because simple wealth
transfers do not affect the overall level of social welfare.11 3 In the
context of patent racing, however, the transfer of surplus from
consumers to producers will result in dissipation of the
surplus.11 4 Therefore, the cost of a patent is the difference in
consumer surplus between monopoly and perfect competition, or,
in other words, the sum of the deadweight loss and the monopoly
rent. Thus, contrary to conventional thinking, the cost of a
patent is not the deadweight loss over the entire patent term.
The cost of patent protection is the deadweight loss plus the
monopoly rent to producers-I shall call this sum the "monopoly
cost"-but only after independent invention would have occurred.
The monopoly cost at a particular time t depends on the
elasticity of demand and supply. Variations in monopoly cost
over time can be expressed as a function C(t). The cumulative
monopoly cost over a period would thus be the integral, JC(t).
quantity-zero--if there were no "monopoly." Too few tea bags is better
than no tea bags.
JOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES § 5:36 (2d ed.
2006).
111 PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 182-83 (16th ed.
1998).
112 See id. at 182.
113 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 14
(1989) ("When wealth is merely transferred, society as a whole is neither better nor
worse off.").
114 McFetridge & Rafiquzzaman, supra note 96, at 93.
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III. A NEW TEST OF PATENTABILITY
A. Balancing the Benefits and Costs
A patent is a bargain between society and inventors. 115 In
return for creating and disclosing inventions, society rewards the
inventor with patent rents. Society has no reason to offer losing
bargains. 1 6 As such, patents should only be available when the
patent incentive creates more social benefits than granting the
patent exacts in costs.
As shown above, the benefit to society is the consumer
surplus, expressed as a mathematical function B(t). This is
shown below in Figure 2:
The benefit of a patent accrues from the moment the
invention is first made available until the time when
independent invention would have occurred, and is the
cumulative consumer surplus during this period. There is a
sharp up-tick in the benefit of a patent to society at the moment
when the patent expires and the invention enters perfect
115 Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) ("[Tlhe patent system
represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the
public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for an
exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time.").
116 Cf. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 ("[Congress may not] enlarge
the patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit
gained thereby.").
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competition. Mathematically, the benefit can be expressed as a
definite integral:
J B (t) (Equation 1)
Where
I = Time of independent invention, as a value of time t; and
P = Time of patentee invention, as a value of time t.
The integral appears as the highlighted area in Figure 3.
Correspondingly, a patented invention incurs monopoly cost
until the patent expires (there is no monopoly after patent
expiration). As noted above, monopoly loss is not a true cost until
society has an alternative, i.e., perfect competition through
independent invention. Thus, the cost of a patent is the
cumulative monopoly cost between the time of independent
invention and the time of patent expiration. Expressed
mathematically, it is:
IfC() (Equation 2)
Where
E = The time of expiration of the patent, as a value of time t;
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and
I = The time of independent invention, as a value of time t.
The integral representing the cumulative cost appears as
Figure 4:
F igure 4
A patent should issue if benefits exceed costs. Given a fixed
patent term and scope, 117 this means a patent should issue only if
the consumer surplus from an invention during the period
between the patentee's invention and a later independent
invention equals or exceeds the monopoly cost after independent
invention. That is, if:
f'B(t) -> fE C(t) (Equation 3)
The use of "equals or exceeds" is necessary because costs
may equal benefits. One such case is where benefits and costs
both equal zero; for example, if the patentee can perfectly price
discriminate (leading to zero consumer surplus) but independent
invention occurs at or after patent expiration (leading to zero
117 It is important to assume fixed patent term and scope because the patent
length and breadth also affect the cost-benefit balance. This assumption is justified
because the obviousness test cannot change the patent term or scope. See infra text
accompanying note 140.
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cost).118 So long as independent invention would occur only at or
after patent expiration, the patent should always be granted. 1" 9
B. Defining Independent Invention
It should be evident that the time of independent invention,
I, is a critical determinant of patentability.120 The time when
society would otherwise have received the same invention
through an independent inventor marks the boundary between
when a patentee does unambiguous good (giving society
something it otherwise would not have) to when the patentee
causes social harm by exacting monopoly costs. Independent
invention must contribute the same invention as the patentee,
but do it for free. This entails three conditions: (1) independence
from the patentee; (2) independence from the patent system; and
(3) public disclosure and dedication to the public domain. A
decision-maker evaluating a patent application under the test
outlined in this Article must project the timing of when an
independent inventor with these three characteristics will
emerge.
118 Equation 3 implicitly assumes that I > P and E > . If independent invention
occurs before P, the benefit function would yield a nonsensical answer; as would the
cost function if independent invention occurred after E. It is sufficient to say that the
patent should never be granted if I < P (as there would be no benefit), and should
always be granted if E < I.
119 The fact that Equation 3 dictates that we should always grant the patent if
independent invention would occur after patent expiration allows us to ignore the
additional benefit of the invention entering the public domain through patent
expiration, since the patent would always be granted even without considering this
factor. This avoids the many complexities that would arise if patentability was to
affect the optimal timing of innovation. See infra Part IV.A.
120 Several commentators have previously suggested using independent
invention as a personal defense to patent infringement. See Stephen M. Maurer &
Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent Invention Defence in Intellectual Property, 69
ECONOMICA 535 (2002), and Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent
Infringement, supra note 95. In a recent article, Professor Vermont notes that using
independent invention to invalidate would mean "pirates would [then] free-ride on
the efforts of reinventors." Samson Vermont, The Angel Is in the Big Picture: A
Response to Lemley, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1537, 1542 (2007). This is not a bad thing: If
independent inventors dedicate their inventions to the public-as they must to fit
within the definition of independent invention that I have proposed-such
dedication to the public domain is designed to permit free-riding by others.
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1. Independence from the Patentee
The intuition for this requirement is simple: a purported
independent inventor who simply copies the patentee's patent
verbatim and publishes it has contributed absolutely nothing. A
rival who benefits from the patentee's research, even when
deriving less than the extreme example given above, cannot
claim independent invention because the patentee is still part of
the invention process. If society had not offered the patent, the
patentee would not have existed' 21 and the rival's invention
would thus have taken more time to independently replicate
whatever the patentee contributed. Projecting a time of
independent invention necessarily asks, for this requirement,
"when would an independent inventor who received absolutely
nothing from the patentee have invented the same invention?"
2. Independence from the Patent System
While independence from the patentee is intuitive, an
independent inventor must do more: he must not be a participant
in the patent race for the invention.
Patent races are an inevitable part of the patent system. 122
At the same time, research leading to a patent is a winner-take-
all race. The first inventor to an invention receives the patent
and the twenty-year monopoly; 123 every other budding inventor
not only fails to win the patent, but instead suffers the loss of all
sunk investments due to the patent's power to exclude them from
the market. 24 Thus, the loser has a powerful incentive, after the
fact of losing, to invalidate the patent that issues on the
invention.
At the same time, due to the incremental nature of scientific
progress in general, and exacerbated by the competition of the
patent race in particular, many inventors come very close to each
other in achieving the same breakthroughs. This has been
witnessed in many important inventions in history: Edison and
121 More accurately, he would invent only much later when the cost of research
has decreased sufficiently to match the reduced (perfectly competitive) producer
surplus.
122 See supra text accompanying note 100.
123 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
124 See Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. REV. 926, 931-32
(2000).
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Swann with the light bulb, Bell and Gray with the telephone. 125
Such simultaneous inventions occur with neither researcher
stealing the research of the other. But if these simultaneous
inventions were to invalidate the resulting patent, no patent
would issue on many inventions. Because of the predictability of
patent racing, before investing in research, Firm A can predict
that its rival Firm B will create nearly-simultaneous
breakthroughs with regularity and that the simultaneous
breakthrough will destroy the prospect of a patent for both. Firm
A will thus not invest in the research; nor will Firm B under the
same rationale. Thus, the incentives of the patent system would
be seriously harmed, as only a firm with an extremely dominant
advantage in research, without fear of rivals entering the race,
would pursue the patent. 126
Thus in framing the inquiry under Equation 3, the inquiry is
not how long it would have taken anyone to develop the same
invention. Rather, the inquiry asks, "when would an
independent inventor, one not motivated by the prospect of
patenting the invention, have developed the same invention?" Of
course, it is difficult to discern the subjective motivations of
purported independent inventors. But an inventor who is
interested in filing for patent protection will presumably not
voluntarily subject himself to a statutory bar if he believes he can
still patent the invention. 127 Thus, an invention disclosed into
the public domain and voluntarily subjected to a statutory bar,
without the purported independent inventor knowing of any
limitation on patentability, i.e., without knowing that another
party has beat him to the patent, is likely to be genuinely
independent of the patent system.
125 See Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, supra note 102, at 461-
62 (describing the development of the telephone by multiple inventors).
126 If rivals could agree to divide the market for research, this would not be a
problem. But such an arrangement would be suspect under the antitrust laws. See
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY §§ 3.2.3 & 5.1 (1995), available at www.
usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf (noting that horizontal agreements to
reduce output in "innovation markets" may be per se illegal); see also Duffy,
Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, supra note 102, at 460 & n.79.
127 See infra text accompanying note 177. It may be possible to relax this
requirement somewhat by permitting other reliable evidence of lack of interest in
patenting, such as a longstanding corporate policy against seeking patent protection.
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This test may be under-inclusive in practice. Once we have a
patent system, there may be independent inventors who are not
motivated by the patent system-in the sense that they would do
the exact same thing if there were no patent system-but who
nonetheless choose to apply for a patent once they develop an
invention. 128 On matters of practical proof,129 these independent
inventors would be excluded from eligibility even though,
considering independent invention in theory, they should be
included. But it is difficult to devise a practical test for
determining non-reliance on the patent incentive without
requiring abstention from the patent system itself.
3. Dedication of the Invention to the Public Domain
Lastly, it is important to note that an independent inventor
must contribute the same thing as the patentee, which is to
disclose the invention into the public domain. It is not enough
that the same invention would be independently conceived-
society does not receive the invention in perfect competition
unless it is disclosed. Thus, an inquiry into independent
invention must further ask: "When would the independently
conceived invention have been fully disclosed into the public
domain?"
The public disclosure requirement serves an additional
function of preventing strategic use of the trade secret system.
The trade secret system is another form of incentive for
innovation. 130 If General Motors invented a new method of
manufacturing cars cheaply, it can enjoy rents either by
patenting the method or by using the method in secret and
gaining a competitive advantage-both serve to encourage
research into new assembly methods. Disclosing the invention in
a patent, however, means the invention will fall to the public
domain in 20 years. A trade secret, by contrast, can last
indefinitely. For this reason, an inventor who files for a patent
128 See Barton, supra note 6, at 492 (noting that "there are industries in which
the level of research is set by economic forces, and then patents are obtained on the
basis of whatever invention has occurred").
129 See infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing proving independent invention in actual
litigation).
13o See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974) (finding that
encouragement of innovation is a policy objective of trade secret law).
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will have priority over one who keeps the invention a trade
secret, even if the trade secret holder was the first to conceive.
131
This creates the effect that a prior inventor who keeps an
invention a trade secret will not only lose the trade secret, but
will also be excluded from the market if a patent issues to a
competitor. 132
The trade secret holder thus has the same incentive as a
patent race rival-to disclose his trade secret and pass it off as
an "independent" invention to invalidate the competitor's patent
and avoid being excluded from the market. The problem with
this type of strategic disclosure is the same as in the patent-
racing context: If the patent had not been available, there would
have been no incentive to disclose the trade secret. We thus need
to separate the purported independent inventor who is really a
trade secret holder in disguise from the true independent
inventor who would have dedicated the invention to the public
domain regardless of whether a patent was available.
In reality, this inquiry is difficult because an invention starts
as a trade secret by default, it remains a trade secret absent
disclosure, 133 and no one but a mind-reader can determine with
certainty why a purported independent inventor is disclosing his
invention.134 But just as a patent seeking inventor is unlikely to
voluntarily subject himself to a statutory bar if unaware of a
rival winning the patent race, so too an opportunistic trade secret
holder is unlikely to voluntarily disclose his trade secret if he is
not aware of an imminent patent on the same invention.
131 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2000); Palmer v. Dudzik, 481 F.2d 1377, 1385-86
(C.C.P.A. 1973).
132 See W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir.
1983) ("As between a prior inventor who benefits from a process by selling its
product but suppresses, conceals, or otherwise keeps the process from the public,
and a later inventor who promptly files a patent application... the law favors the
latter."); see also Apotex USA, Inc. v. Merck & Co., 254 F.3d 1031, 1038 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
133 Howard T. Markey, Why Not the Statute?, 65 J. PAT. OFF. SoCY 331, 333
(1983).
134 This is not a problem for some inventions that are self-disclosing. For
example, the idea of an online auction, such as eBay, becomes understood by anyone
who sees it in public use. In such cases, the trade secret holder cannot enjoy secret
rents. See generally Katherine J. Strandburg, W'hat Does the Public Get?
Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 107-11 (2004)
(exploring the patent system's differing incentives for self-disclosing and non-self-
disclosing inventions).
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Independence from the trade secret system can thus be proven by
requiring disclosure of the invention while the independent
inventor is ignorant of the patentee.
In summary, independent invention is the time when
another inventor will disclose the same invention to the public
domain, while ignorant of the patentee and the patentee's
disclosure, and without intending to file for a patent himself on
the invention.
IV. OBJECTIONS AND COMPLICATIONS
A. The Affect on Incentives
An important consideration for any change to the patent
system is how patent incentives would be affected. By this I do
not mean whether it will generally enhance or reduce the
incentive for research per se. Patents generally increase the
incentive for research. 135 The question is whether the incentive
is optimal in light of the costs of patents.
A patent is in the nature of a unilateral offer for contract
between society and inventors. 136 Society promises that if an
inventor accelerates and discloses an invention that creates more
social benefits than costs, society will reward the inventor with a
patent of fixed term and scope. In many ways, this is no different
than the government promising that a contractor who builds a
fighter plane capable of flying at 2,000 mph will receive $100
million dollars. Society must offer sufficient reward-in longer
and broader patents that create more monopoly rent, or simply in
cash-such that a firm can justify the investment in research-in
fighter planes or anything else.137 At the same time, society has
135 This should be qualified somewhat. When there are many overlapping
patents, the transaction costs of the patent system may reduce the incentives for
research. This is often referred to as the "patent thicket" problem. See, e.g., Michael
A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons
in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698-99 (1998); Chris Holman, Clearing a
Path Through the Patent Thicket, 125 CELL 629, 630 (2006).
136 Cf. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51
(1989) ("The federal patent system ... embodies a carefully crafted bargain for
encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and nonobvious advances in
technology and design in return for the exclusive right to practice the invention for a
period of years.").
137 At the same time, broader scope and longer term increases the cost under
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no reason to subject itself to a losing bargain. A condition of the
patent contract should be that social benefits must exceed social
costs. I shall call this the "patentability condition," and it
corresponds to the formula in Equation 3.
The patent contract offered to inventors has additional
terms, most importantly the patent length and breadth.
Optimizing the patent term and scope is complex. 138 Longer
patents may create such enormous incentives that research funds
are diverted from other places where they could have been more
socially efficiently invested (a cost); at the same time, those same
incentives may cause inventions to be created inventions earlier
such that the patent expires earlier (a benefit). 139 The test for
patentability, however, is not concerned with the optimization of
the patent contract. The patent term and breadth are fixed
under other provisions of the statute.140 Welfare effects flowing
from these additional conditions, such as the benefit of early
patent expiration,' 4 ' are therefore not considered under Equation
3.
Determining the validity of patents-either in the patent
office or in litigation-is concerned only with whether the patent
contract (including the patentability condition) has been
satisfied. Validity analysis should not alter the overall patent
bargain itself. Determining whether an invention should be
patentable is thus no different from determining whether any
seller has satisfied the terms of his contract, for example,
whether a proffered plane really travels at 2,000 mph. Society
Equation 3 because the monopoly is both broader and longer-lasting after
independent invention. As such, a firm wishing to meet the criteria under Equation
3 must devote even more resources, to achieve even earlier invention, in order to
meet the criteria of Equation 3 for a longer-term patent. An equilibrium may be
achieved where patent research is beneficial; or it may be that achieving a
sufficiently early value of P and E to satisfy Equation 3 is not worth the increased
cost of research under any circumstance-assuming a constant value of I
throughout-in which case the equilibrium result is simply that everyone, including
the patentee, is better off if we wait for independent invention and the patentee
makes no investment.
138 See generally Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 109.
139 Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, supra note 102, at 466-68.-
140 See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (Supp. II 2002) (term of a patent); 35 U.S.C. § 271 (Supp.
III 2003) (defining patent infringement); 35 U.S.C. §§ 281-289 (2000 & Supp. II
2002) (providing remedies for infringement).
141 See generally Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, supra note
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has the option to reject unpatentable inventions just as a buyer
who receives goods delivered by a seller has the option to reject
nonconforming goods. 142 Assuming that the statutory patent
term and breadth achieves a given cost-benefit balance, the
question is whether subsequent application of the patentability
test distorts the balance already achieved.
In a world of certainty, market-participant research firms
will themselves determine the correct allocation of resources for
research in light of the bargain offered by the patent system.143
A research firm will not undertake research unless it can achieve
the invention at a sufficiently early time for P and E (expiration
being dependent on filing) such that the resulting invention
satisfies the patentability condition. 144 Enforcing the
patentability condition of Equation 3 then offers optimal
incentives, as does enforcement of any other freely negotiated
contract. Including the patentability condition as part of the
contract was also efficient, as above, because society has no
reason to grant patents that diminish welfare, while it should
certainly encourage patents for inventions that enhance welfare.
The complication is uncertainty. Firms must predict the
eventual values of the variables in Equation 3: the cost of
research and the corresponding monopoly rent they will get.
These predictions must be made at the time of deciding to make
investments in research-but the payday comes when the
invention is complete. Inevitably some predictions will be wrong.
How is this risk to be allocated?
As a general rule, the risk of mistake should be allocated to
the party best able to avoid the mistake, or, if the mistake cannot
be reasonably avoided, to the superior risk-bearer.' 45 Here, the
mistake can be of two kinds. First, the research firm may
misestimate any of the variables, resulting in the research being
more costly, the invention created being unpatentable under
Equation 3, or the monopoly rent being less than projected. 46 All
142 U.C.C. § 2-601 (2004).
143 Cf. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-3 (1960)
(describing market allocation in zero transaction cost environment).
144 Additionally, the research firm will also undertake research only if Equation
3 can be satisfied at a sufficiently low research cost for the firm such that the firm
makes more in expected monopoly rent than it expends in research costs.
145 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.4 (7th ed. 2007).
146 Or vice versa, i.e., the invention is even more profitable than initially
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of these mistakes are more easily avoided by the research firm.
On the other hand, the mistake can also be made by the Patent
Office or the court deciding whether the invention is patentable;
that is, one could wrongfully reject the patent. The research firm
can do relatively little about Patent Office mistakes. If it were
possible, this risk should be allocated on the Patent Office.
It is not possible, however, to make the Patent Office or its
examiners pay directly for their mistakes. 147 The risk can only be
directly allocated to the research firm or to consumers. 148 While
the research firm can do little to correct Patent Office errors, it
can probably do more than consumers can-by exerting political
pressure on the Patent Office ex post as described in Part IV.B.1.
As for the superior risk-bearer, risk for research firms is
ultimately borne by the firm's shareholders, who can diversify
the risk in capital markets. The risk for consumers depends on
the nature of the patent at issue; while consumers are usually
diversified, a single patent may affect only a segment of
consumers. At a minimum, there is no reason to prefer
reallocating the risk from diversified shareholders to consumers.
On balance, the entire risk is more appropriately allocated to the
research firm.
B. Difficulty of Determining Variables
1. The Advantage of Ex Post Verification
As with any theoretical standard, applying the theory to
reality requires empirical data that is not usually available. The
key variables of benefit, cost, and timing of independent
invention are difficult to predict before the patent is issued. It is
important, however, to emphasize that a key advantage of the
objective test described in this Article over the traditional
"ingenuity" test is that the variables can be determined at all.
The traditional test of whether a hypothetical person would have
thought. The potential variance is the economic concept of risk.
147 See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571-74 (1959) (holding that government
employees enjoy absolute immunity for their official conduct).
148 Consumers suffer higher prices and reduced output from wrongfully
patented inventions. Competitors and potential competitors also split some of the
loss with consumers for a wrongful patent. However, these competitors are not in a
materially different position than the patentee.
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found a given invention "obvious" is an inquiry inherently
incapable of verification. One may disagree with the opinion of a
judge, juror, examiner, or expert on the issue, but that opinion
cannot be objectively disproved.
In contrast, the costs, benefits, and timing of independent
invention are facts capable of real-world verification. If the
Patent Office predicts that independent invention will occur in
two years for an invention and rejects the patent on that basis, in
two years we can see whether the Patent Office predicted
accurately. In the long-run, the Patent Office will be able to
adjust its projections in light of past experiences. While we may
not have perfect information for every patent application even
after patent expiration-for example, we cannot be sure of the
precise timing of independent invention if a patent is granted
since the patentee's disclosure might preempt the emergence of
actual independent inventors-we can use statistical studies
across large samples to determine the overall performance of the
patent system. Are there too many patents that later prove
invalid? Or are patent applications routinely rejected using
projections that later turn out to be incorrect?
Verification allows political accountability because repeat-
players in the patent system have a keen interest in correct
outcomes. If the Patent Office and courts systematically under-
predict benefits, over-predict costs, and estimate independent
invention occurring sooner than what eventually turns out to be
the case, research firms such as pharmaceutical companies will
surely bring political pressure to correct this trend using
empirical evidence of the errors. On the other hand, if the Patent
Office and courts systematically over-predict benefits, under-
predict costs, and estimate independent invention occurring later
than what eventually turns out to be the case, frequent accused
infringers such as software firms and generic drug companies
will likely bring the same political pressure to bear.
Of course, the patentability test is not just a matter of ex
post verification. The validity of a patent must be decided before
the evidence is fully available. It is useful to separately discuss
the problems at the two stages of an obviousness determination:
the initial patent office determination of whether a patent should
be granted and subsequent disputes over the patent's validity.
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2. Validity Determinations in Initial Examination
A prospective estimation of the likely benefits and costs of a
patent will be difficult for the overwhelming majority of patents
before they issue.14 9 In practice, this means that the Patent
Office should not even attempt such an estimation for most
patents because the average patent is likely to have no value or
cost of any significance that justifies such expenditure of
administrative resources to examine it.
The consensus among economists and antitrust scholars is
that the overwhelming majority of patents grant no economic
rents of any significance. 150 This is because while patents confer
a legal monopoly, they do not necessarily confer an economic
monopoly.' 5' Stated simply, most patents are on inventions that
are either entirely useless, or at least readily substitutable. And
without economic monopoly a patent has no value or cost.
Obviousness analysis that is costly should not be undertaken for
the run-of-the-mill-patent with low expected cost and the patent
should simply be granted. 15 2 Such a laid-back attitude towards
149 See Giles S. Rich, The Proposed Patent Legislation: Some Comments, 35 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 641, 642, 648 (1967) (noting that "[u]nder Graham, relevant factors to
be considered in determining section 103 non-obviousness include several that will
rarely exist until after the grant of a patent" and advocating the granting of
borderline patents).
150 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 10.3c (2d. ed. 1999) ("[M]ost patents confer
absolutely no market power on their owners."); Jean Olson Lanjouw, Patent
Protection in the Shadow of Infringement: Simulation Estimations of Patent Value,
65 REV. ECON. STUD. 671, 672, 675 (1998); Mark Schankerman, How Valuable Is
Patent Protection? Estimates by Technology Field, 29 RAND J. ECON. 77, 79 (1998);
see also Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006) (abrogating
presumption of market power in the holder of a patent).
151 See Rapp & Stiroh, supra note 105, at 2 ("Most patents are worth only a little
because while the inventions they disclose may be novel and useful, they are minor,
'commodity inventions' for which close substitutes exist.").
152 The question may arise regarding why the default rule should be to
summarily grant the patent instead of summarily rejecting the patent; since the
average patent has neither much value nor much cost, a rational patent-seeking
firm loses very little incentive if it loses only an asset with low expected value
anyway. There are several responses, the most important being that the
reexamination procedure and litigation provide second chances to invalidate the
wrongfully-issued patent that later turns out to be very costly to society, but there is
no mechanism for subsequently granting a wrongfully rejected patent that years
later turns out to be very valuable (assuming that the patent applicant gives up
after the rejection due to the low ex ante expected return). See infra note 170.
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examination, of course, will result in the occasional wrongfully
issued patent that, contrary to initial expectations, eventually
becomes very costly. 153  But unless the costly patent can be
cheaply identified ex ante for serious examination, society will be
better off overall with the occasional costly patent and low
administrative costs for patent examination. 154
This does not necessarily mean, however, that we should
disband the Patent Office and grant every patent application
that comes. There are some patent applications that can be
easily identified as likely to create large monopoly costs because
they will confer true economic monopolies: A miracle drug that
cures cancer is likely to fall into this category. These are the
patent applications where an effort should be made to estimate
future benefits and costs. 155 Luckily, within this narrow category
of patent applications, there is reason to think that they
generally will be capable of at least a rough estimation of their
future benefits and costs. After all, the future potential
monopoly cost has been roughly estimated as large already. 156
Undoubtedly in some cases there will be an invention where we
can only generally predict that demand for an invention will be
153 Such a lax approach to patent examination would call into question whether
an issued patent should retain its presumption of validity that can only be overcome
by clear and convincing evidence. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (Supp. II 2002); Am. Hoist &
Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1984); cf. KSR Int'l
Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1745 (2007) (questioning the application of the
presumption of validity when the relevant prior art was not before the Patent
Office).
154 See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1495, 1510-11 (2001).
155 Indeed, the limited empirical evidence available indicates that ex ante
identification of valuable patents while they are still in the Patent Office may be
quite common even today. See John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J.
435, 438 (2004) (finding that ex post valuable patents tend to "cite more prior art,"
"spend longer in prosecution," and "contain more claims than ordinary patents").
156 To be sure, the relationship between the administrative cost of examination
and our ability to estimate the future benefits and costs of an invention is not an
independent one. That is, making an estimate, as part of the obviousness inquiry,
increases the administrative cost of examination and implies that a difficult-to-apply
standard of obviousness will decrease the number of patent applications that are
seriously examined. At the same time, even without the increased cost of applying a
complex obviousness standard, most patent applications will likely have sufficiently
low expected cost of monopoly to not justify serious examination effort to reject
them. See Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, supra note 154, at 1508-
11.
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strong, without any capability of even beginning to guess as to
how strong, but such cases will likely be rare. Thus, the initial
daunting problem of complete inability to determine the future
costs and benefits of a patent poses a problem only rarely for the
patents where it matters.
The other key variable-the timing of independent
invention-also requires prospective estimation. Because an
independent inventor necessarily does not seek a patent for his
invention, the Patent Office will rarely have actual evidence of
subsequent independent invention. 157 In the usual case, the only
thing a patent examiner can do is make the hypothetical inquiry
described in Part III: When would an independent inventor have
disclosed the invention to the public domain?
Relevant factors to consider in this hypothetical inquiry will
likely include the following: (1) the resources available to a
hypothetical independent inventor-general knowledge, printed
publications, and patents, except those derived from the patentee
and strategic disclosures by rivals; 158 (2) the number of potential
independent inventors-people of skill in the relevant field,
excluding those who would seek a patent or trade secret for such
an invention; (3) the differences between the prior art in (1) and
the invention; (4) the difficulty and amount of work that would be
required to achieve the invention; and (5) the general pace of
scientific progress in the field and any special progress leading to
the invention, independent of the patent system. The parallel
with the Graham factors is evident. 159 The underlying evidence
is therefore not materially different from that which is currently
used to determine obviousness. Of course, the analysis is very
different because the timing of independent invention is an
objective fact whose accuracy can be verified later.
For most inventions, even very valuable ones, a rough
estimate of costs and benefits is all we need, depending on when
independent invention occurs. If independent invention will
occur within one year of patentee invention, the benefits in that
one year must outweigh nineteen years of monopoly cost-a
difficult proposition to meet. Similarly, if independent invention
157 The only way it could happen is if the patentee or the examiner fortuitously
discovered the independent inventor's work during the patent examination process.
158 See infra Part V.B.
159 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
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occurs nineteen years after invention, even rough calculation will
likely show the benefits over nineteen years greatly outweighing
one year of monopoly cost. And if independent invention is
projected to occur after the patent expires, a further calculation
of cost is not necessary. While there will be close cases where the
rule is difficult to apply, an objective test that reaches the correct
result in most cases is in all events better than the current
"ingenuity" test, which is misaimed from the beginning and likely
equally difficult to apply in practice.
3. Validity Determinations in Litigation and Reexamination
The validity of a patent can be contested after issuance by
three primary routes: litigation, 160 ex parte reexamination, 16 1 and
inter partes reexamination.1 62 A patent can be challenged as
many times-by different parties-as necessary before it is
declared invalid, 163 though a party that previously lost in
litigation cannot re-litigate validity under res judicata
principles.1 64 Repeated validity challenges may appear unfair to
the patentee; however, it is no different than the unfairness
arising from any other form of non-mutual collateral estoppel.1 65
The patentee also receives offsetting advantages. 66
Determining the patent's validity after its issuance differs
from the initial analysis in the Patent Office in two chief ways.
First, we know that the patent is valuable because someone is
willing to devote significant resources to contest its validity; most
160 See 35 U.S.C. § 282(2) (Supp. II 2002) (providing an invalidity defense in an
action for infringement).
161 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (providing the procedure for
ex parte reexamination).
162 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-318 (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (procedure for inter partes
reexamination).
163 A judgment of invalidity will bind the patentee through non-mutual
collateral estoppel. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S.
313, 350 (1971) (overruling the mutuality requirement of Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S.
638 (1936)).
164 Similar principles apply to inter partes examination. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(c),
317(b) (2000 & Supp..II 2002).
165 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1979).
166 For example, the patentee in litigation receives a presumption of patent
validity. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000). This presumption must be overcome by clear and
convincing evidence of invalidity. WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int'l Game Tech., 184 F.3d
1339, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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typically, this "someone" will be an accused infringer.167 Second,
in the time between the initial grant and the second look, more
information becomes available. The existence of an accused
infringer will usually provide a wealth of data about the benefits
of the invention. For example, an invention that allowed General
Motors, as an infringer, to lower the cost of making a car by $100
will create that amount of consumer surplus, less the cost of a
license. 168 Moreover, in this period there may be an actual
independent invention.
As an initial matter, we may question whether such
subsequent information should be considered as part of litigation.
Courts routinely struggle with the difficult question of whether
subsequent events that show error in an initial projection should
be admissible. 169 This has particular salience in the obviousness
test because validity can be challenged repeatedly. If subsequent
information can be considered, a patent granted based on
information available in 2000 may be invalidated by information
available in 2007; on the other hand, a patent rejected based on
information available in 2000 will remain rejected forever-
absent still-pending appeals, the patent application cannot be
"revived" even if the information in 2007 indicates that it should
167 In litigation, both the patentee and the accused infringer must expend
significant amounts in legal fees. Even ex parte reexamination requires the third-
party requester to locate prior art, prepare a submission to the patent office
detailing why the patent is invalid, and obtain the PTO Director's certification that
there is a "substantial new question of patentability." 35 U.S.C. §§ 302-03 (2002).
168 In this sense GM is the "consumer" of the invention, though it will also pass
some of the surplus to the ultimate consumers through reduced prices. I am
assuming, of course, that the invention can be implemented without any cost at all
except the cost of a license from the patentee.
169 Compare Okerlund v. United States, 365 F.3d 1044, 1051-52 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(finding no error in the district court refusing to admit evidence that an expert's tax
valuation prediction turned out to be wrong) and Morris v. Comm'r, 761 F.2d 1195,
1201 (6th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he measure of the tax must be determined according to the
situation as it existed on the date [in question], and not according to subsequent
events .... ), with First Nat'l Bank of Kenosha v. United States, 763 F.2d 891, 894
(7th Cir. 1985) (holding that evidence of later actual sales prices was admissible).
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have been granted. 170 This asymmetry leads to a bias toward
invalidity if subsequent information is considered.
While the invalidity bias is a real problem, the reason to
consider subsequently available information is compelling:
obviousness analysis likely cannot be done otherwise. An
accurate determination of future costs and benefits based solely
on the information available prior to patent issuance will be
difficult and uneconomical for the vast majority of patents. 171
Few inventions have a readily foreseeable market at the time of
patent issuance, one that would permit estimations of consumer
surplus and monopoly cost. A rule of evidence that excluded all
post-issuance-or, more extremely, all post-conception-
information will likely reduce the patent system to little more
than a random lottery since the data necessary to make an
informed judgment of patentability simply is not available at
that early time for most inventions. 172
Accepting that subsequent events informing the valuations
of benefit, cost, and independent invention must be considered,
how should they be analyzed? If the patentee practices the
170 Historically, in the U.S. patent system a patent could never be completely
and finally rejected. See Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of
Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 64 (2004). In response to a nominally
"final" rejection, the applicant faced the choice of abandoning the prosecution or
paying a new fee to keep going. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.113-1.114 (2006). Very recently,
the PTO enacted new rules that require permission to keep going after the fourth
"final" rejection, without which the applicant would be denied priority to the original
filing date. Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent
Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims
in Patent Applications, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716, 46,841 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to be codified at
37 C.F.R. pt. 1). Whether under the old or new rule, there is no reason for the
applicant to pay a new fee unless there is some prospect of overcoming the rejection
and a final rejection was thus designed to provoke abandonment by the applicant.
An abandoned application can only be revived in very limited circumstances. See 37
C.F.R. § 1.137 (2006). The later-demonstrated incorrectness of the rejection that
provoked the abandonment is not one of those circumstances.
171 See supra text accompanying notes 150-154.
172 It is notable that the current law considers many later developments in
determining obviousness, under the rubric of "secondary considerations." Secondary
considerations include, for example, later copying of the invention by others. Pro-
Mold & Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
They also include later commercial success of the invention. Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). Though rarely invoked, subsequent independent
invention by others is also occasionally considered as a secondary consideration. See
infra Part V.A. 1.
[Vol. 82:39
PATENT OBVIOUSNESS
invention, the patentee's own sales and profits will provide
important information on supply and demand for the invention,
laying the foundation for estimates of B(t) and C(t). The presence
of an accused infringer provides more of the same type of
information. While we cannot have a perfect estimate of the cost
of monopoly unless the patentee actually manages to exclude
competitors (or charge them license fees), having established
markets allows economic experts to make estimates of the
relevant variables; such expert market analysis is routine in
antitrust cases. 173
The most important subsequent development occurs if actual
independent invention takes place. As defined previously, an
actual independent invention takes place if another inventor
creates the same invention (1) without contribution from the
patentee or anything derivative of the patentee, (2) without
intending to patent the invention, and (3) dedicates the invention
to the public domain while remaining ignorant of the patentee.
174
The occurrence of actual independent invention sets the
maximum value for J.175 The earlier I is, the less time there is to
accrue benefit and the more time there is to accrue cost. Thus if
the invention is unpatentable using the time of actual
independent invention as I, it cannot be patentable if I was an
earlier value. An accused infringer, therefore, should strive to
demonstrate independent invention-including by pointing to his
own activities if they were done without contribution from the
patentee. The challenge is to define the criteria for admissible
evidence.
Of the three conditions of independent invention, dedication
to the public domain is easiest to ascertain. An invention can be
dedicated to the public domain in manifold ways, such as by
publishing the idea or publicly demonstrating the idea to others.
173 See 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ROGER D. BLAIR & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION
393 (2d ed. 2006). The expert testimony is concededly less than perfectly reliable.
However, the objective nature of the inquiry at least allows meaningful analysis and
cross-examination.
174 See supra Part III.B.
175 In a world without patent incentives, independent invention may have
occurred earlier, such as by another inventor who in reality discontinued research
upon learning of the patentee's disclosure; but there is no reason independent
invention would have occurred later in a hypothetical world than in reality.
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Because there is a required element of publicity, the evidence is
usually easily verified. The requirements of independence from
the patentee and the patentee's disclosure, and demonstrating
ignorance up to the time of dedication, are more difficult to prove
because the purported independent inventor must demonstrate a
negative. This difficulty can be overcome by rigorously
documenting the sources of information received by researchers
and publication committees. In this respect, it is notable that
firms already routinely instruct their scientists not to search
patents for fear of willful infringement liability.176
The biggest problem is determining whether the purported
independent inventor is truly independent from the patent
system; that is, whether he had intended to patent the invention
and only abandoned that plan upon discovering that another
inventor had already won the race. This problem arises because
patent applications can be filed up to one year after disclosure.1 77
Thus, the mere fact of disclosure does not necessarily reflect an
intent to forgo patenting; only the expiration of the one-year
grace period raises a 102(b) statutory bar.
To conclusively establish non-reliance on the patent system,
the independent inventor would have to disclose the invention
without knowledge of the patentee's disclosure and fail to file a
patent for one year while still remaining ignorant of the
patentee's disclosure for the entire period. In cases where this
occurs, there is no problem; we have a genuine independent
inventor. But a per se requirement that the purported
independent inventor remain ignorant for one entire year after
public disclosure would permit strategic behavior by the
patentee: A patentee could strategically prevent evidence of an
otherwise genuine independent invention from emerging by
specifically disclosing his patent to the independent inventor
during the one year period.
The assessment of non-reliance in circumstances where the
subsequent inventor receives knowledge of the patentee
within one year after disclosure must depend on a factual
176 Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness
Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1100-01 (2003) ("I]n-house patent counsel
and many outside lawyers regularly advise their clients not to read patents if there
is any way to avoid it.").
177 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
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determination. If the subsequent inventor appears to have made
the disclosure as a prelude to patent filing (for example, the
disclosure touts the invention as a tremendous improvement over
the prior art), that cannot be considered a genuine independent
invention. In contrast, a firm intending to market a product that
it independently invented-and wishing to prevent an unknown
patentee from strategic ex post disclosure within one year-
might publicly renounce the option of filing a future patent
application to preserve its independent inventor status.178
Another method would be filing a statutory invention
registration, which discloses the invention but waives the right to
patent protection. 179 Firms uninterested in patent protection
might also publicize a corporate policy that the firm will not seek
patents; a longstanding policy of such nature may provide
sufficient reliability to be given credence.
Against the potential strategies outlined above for
independent inventors wishing to preserve their status, a
strategy remains available to the patentee to preempt
independent invention. The patentee can make it impossible to
remain ignorant of his patent by saturating the field with
knowledge of his patent. This strategy will effectively prevent
the emergence of harmful evidence of actual independent
invention because any conception will not be demonstrably
independent of the patentee. This patentee strategy is less
problematic, however, because society receives many collateral
benefits from widespread publicizing of a patent. For example, a
patentee who publicizes his patent will find it more difficult to
practice the widely-criticized "troll" strategy, where the holder of
a patent over a small component waits until an industry sinks
large investments in a product incorporating the component and
then asserts the patent to extort the value of avoiding forfeiture
of that investment.180  Widespread knowledge of the patent
impedes this strategy because potential infringers would not, ex
178 An abandonment of the invention renders it unpatentable. 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(c).
179 See 35 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
180 See generally Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty
Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007) (discussing the troll strategy).
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ante, sink large investments into a product if it anticipated being
excluded from the market later.181
C. The Confiscation Problem
Once the variables are determined, inevitably some patent
applications will result in rejection. For example, the Patent
Office may determine that independent invention will occur in
five years and the benefits in the meantime do not justify a
patent due to large costs after independent invention occurs.
What happens in the five years until independent invention
arrives? Do we publish the application so that we can have the
invention today?
Initially, the temptation to confiscate may be strong.
Because we are rejecting the patent, the incentive effect
of the patent system is already lacking. The next inventor
contemplating researching a similar invention-in the sense of
similar economic risk, cost, and benefits rather than technical
similarity-will have a lower incentive to seek a patent whether
or not we publish the rejected patent application. Even if the
rejection was incorrect, the risk of wrongful rejections is best
placed on the patentee to provide incentives for patentees to
apply political pressure on the Patent Office to minimize future
errors. 182
The problem with this analysis is that it ignores the
incentives and benefits of the trade secret system. A rejection of
the patent under the test in Part III indicates that the
acceleration benefits do not outweigh the costs of a patent,
nothing more. The inventor, however, may still create more
benefits for society with a trade secret than the cost of a trade
secret. 183 By disclosing the application while denying the patent,
181 But see id. at 2003-05 (suggesting that even prior knowledge of a somewhat
valuable but likely invalid patent would still result in an inflated royalty). One
statutory change that would increase this benefit would be to change the marking
requirement, 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2000), to require marking on publications disclosing a
patented idea. Under current law, the patentee can saturate the field with a
publication such as a scientific article that preempts future independent inventors,
but practice the troll strategy if other firms do not realize that the idea in the article
has been patented.
182 See supra Part V.A.
183 Because a trade secret evaporates upon public disclosure, the value of E (by
analogy) would be the same as I, rendering fC(t) always equal to zero for trade
[Vol. 82:39
PATENT OBVIOUSNESS
we would be confiscating the trade secret rents and thus the
trade secret incentive.
Should the patentee have the option of returning to the trade
secret system if his foray into the patent system is unsuccessful?
In an environment of uncertainty, permitting an inventor to
revert to the trade secret system if the patent application is
rejected can be efficient, as the following hypothetical
demonstrates. Assume that an invention costs $100 to develop
by time P, that independent invention will occur 5 years after P,
and that the consumer surplus between P and I is $70 whether
the invention is used as a trade secret or patented. Assume also
that the monopoly rent between P and I will be $75 whether the
invention is patented or kept secret, but that the monopoly rent
between I and E is $60 and is only available if the patent is
granted (if the patent is rejected, the rent after I is zero).
Finally, assume that the patentee believes that there is a 50%
chance the examiner will correctly determine the cost after I to
be $65 (allowing the patent), and a 50% chance the examiner will
determine the cost to be $80 (rejecting the patent). The patentee
intends to file an application upon conception, and the Patent
Office will make a decision immediately.
If we allow the patentee to revert to the trade secret system
in the event of patent rejection, the patentee's expected payoff is
$105.184 The patentee will therefore undertake the research and
produce the invention, creating an expected social benefit of
$37.50.185 On the other hand, if we do not allow the patentee to
revert to the trade secret system-forcing the patentee to
secrets. This does not mean that the trade secret system is superior to the patent
system. In cases where the patent expires before independent invention occurs, a
patented invention will fall into the public domain sooner than a trade secret,
creating social benefits. See Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, supra
note 102, at 444-45, 467.
184 There is a 50% chance of entering the trade secret system for a payoff of $75
and a 50% chance of receiving the patent for a payoff of $135. ($75x0.5) + ($135x0.5)
= $105.
185 (($70-$65)x0.5) + ($70x0.5) = $37.50. It bears emphasis that this figure is
somewhat artificial, because the trade secret system is not directly comparable to
the patent system. See supra note 183.
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choose-the expected payoff is $75.186 The patentee will thus not
develop the invention at all.187
The numbers can be changed to produce a situation where
the confiscation of trade secret rents yields social benefits in the
short run. If the value of the patent is high enough, and the risk
of patent rejection low enough, and the value of the trade secret
in comparison low enough, an inventor will surrender his trade
secret rents for a ticket in the patent lottery. This potential
situation, however, essentially increases the cost for inventors to
enter the patent system, a cost that the same inventors will
expect to recoup through higher monopoly profits.188 Under
Equation 3, a patent that is socially costly will already be
rejected and forfeiting the firm's patent-related research costs
maintains the overall incentive structure of the patent system.
Forcing firms to surrender even more value, i.e., the trade secret
rents not attributable to patent system incentives, reduces
incentives and distorts the balance struck by Equation 3.
D. Delay Between Conception and Disclosure
In Part I.A, I defined the incentive benefit as accelerating
the "invention." The benefit to society is the accrual of consumer
surplus between the time of receiving the patentee's invention
and the time when society otherwise would have received the
same invention through an independent inventor. In more
practical terms, however, society receives very little benefit from
simple conception by the patentee. An invention usually requires
a path of several steps: (1) the idea is conceived; (2) a working
model is built; (3) a patent application is filed; (4) the idea is
186 The patentee will choose the greater of the trade secret payoff ($75) or the
expected patent payoff ($135x0.5=$67.5). Because the trade secret payoff is greater,
the patentee will not file for a patent.
187 Changing the variables slightly, such as by increasing the monopoly rent
between P and I from $75 to $101, will cause the patentee to develop the invention
but not file for the patent if the patent system forces a choice.
188 At first glance, offering trade secret holders the option of entering the patent
system would appear to be a bad deal no matter what. The trade secret holder would
presumably choose the higher reward, being whichever option earned the most in
monopoly profits. Strandburg, supra note 134, at 112 ("[A]n inventor's choice to
patent will ordinarily signify that patenting gives a longer period of exclusivity than
trade secret protection."). One answer to this objection is that the disclosure provides
the opportunity for others to improve upon the invention during the patent term,
once it is disclosed. Id. at 112-13.
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published in an article; (5) the patent is issued; and (6) the idea
is embodied in a commercial product.18 9 The delay between
conception and eventual patent issuance creates the problem of
defining a precise point for determining the value of P. When
should the patentee receive credit for the accrual of consumer
surplus?
Initially, the answer may appear that P should start at the
time of conception. After all, the patentee cannot affect the time
of independent invention, I, and thus any consumer surplus from
the moment of conception is a benefit to society. The problem,
however, with beginning the consumer surplus "clock" at
conception is that it creates two perverse incentives: the
incentive to delay disclosure and the incentive to delay filing a
patent application.
The patent system is designed to encourage early disclosure
and early filing. The most important reason is that filing sets the
time for patent expiration. 190 Disclosure provides an incentive to
file because filing must occur within one year of disclosure or the
patent is forfeited. 19' Incentives are needed to encourage early
filing and disclosure because patentees have many reasons to
delay filing as much as possible. For many inventions, the first
few years are the least profitable because preparations must be
made before a commercial embodiment can be sold: investors
must be solicited, factories must be built or reconfigured, and, for
pharmaceuticals, FDA approval must be obtained. More
importantly, when an idea is first conceived, the inventor has a
de facto monopoly over it as a trade secret. Absent disclosure or
filing, this monopoly can last indefinitely through the trade
secret system.' 92 Therefore, before either disclosure or filing
occurs, the consumer surplus generated by the patentee's
invention is not attributable to the patent system's incentives-it
is a benefit of the trade secret system. 93  Accordingly, the
consumer surplus accruing before either filing or disclosure has
189 The steps are not necessarily always in this order; for example, the idea may
be published before the patent application is filed.
190 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000) (setting expiration at 20 years from the filing of
the earliest referenced application).
191 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2002).
192 Markey, supra note 133, at 333.
193 Strandburg, supra note 134, at 106 (noting that the trade secret system
provides incentives to invent non-self-disclosing inventions).
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occurred should not be considered in the balancing test of
Equation 3, which is concerned with the benefits accruing from
patent incentives. 194
It is also clear that after filing and disclosure have both
occurred, any consumer surplus generated by the invention
should be counted as part of Equation 3, even if the patent has
not yet issued. The acceleration benefit of the patent system
accrues even when the patent office is slow. The complication is
in the two situations between the extremes: (1) when there is
disclosure but no filing; and (2) when there is filing but no public
disclosure. 195
What should the rule be when the patentee discloses the
invention in an article but has not filed? Initially, one may very
well conclude that this is no different from the situation of the
inventor who neither discloses nor files; that is, the inventor is
attempting to stretch out his monopoly by delaying the eventual
expiration of the patent. Indeed, allowing the consumer surplus
to begin accruing at the time of disclosure notwithstanding a
later filing would create a strong incentive for an inventor to
publish quickly after conception, 196 but also creates an equally
strong incentive for the inventor to then wait exactly one year
after publication before filing the patent application. The
194 It should be noted that one policy implication is that the current
35 U.S.C. § 102(a) should be changed. Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), an inventor who
conceives-but does not disclose-an invention before an independent inventor
publishes the same invention can still obtain a patent, even if he files after the
independent inventor discloses. This would yield no benefit, however, because P does
not occur until disclosure or filing, meaning that P is later than . Under Equation 3,
the patent should never be granted if P > I. See supra note 118. Section 102(a) also
makes it difficult to discern whether the patentee's disclosure was in good faith-we
cannot tell whether the patentee had intended to keep the invention secret, filing
only upon discovering the independent inventor's publication (though if the patentee
was proven to be acting in such bad faith, he would lose priority under
35 U.S.C. § 102(g)).
195 Under 35 U.S.C. § 122, a patent application is confidential for at least 18
months after filing. If the patentee certifies that he will not file for a patent on the
invention overseas, the patent application can be kept confidential until issuance.
196 Unlike every other major patent system, the United States is alone in having
a first-to-invent priority system instead of a first-to-file priority system.
35 U.S.C. § 102(g). See generally Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1361 n.2 (Fed. Cir.
2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1151 (2007). Thus, the early publication of an article
describing the invention-thereby preserving the evidence of early conception-is
sufficient to establish priority entitlement to the patent even if a rival later files the
first patent application.
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inventor would thereby receive an effective 21-year monopoly
because competitors will not invest in entering a market if they
expected a pending patent to soon force them to forfeit that
investment. 197
The difference is that the effective 21-year monopoly is the
product of congressional choice. By enacting 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
and creating a one year grace period, Congress has essentially
condoned the utilization of this mechanism in defining the patent
term.'98 If Congress wishes to set the patent monopoly truly at
20 years-instead of the current effective monopoly of 21 years-
it can do so in many ways: it can reduce the statutory term to 19
years and keep the one year grace period in section 102(b); it can
keep the statutory term at 20 years and eliminate the grace
period in section 102(b); or it can even change the statutory term
to 19 years and reduce the section 102(b) grace period to six
months. There is no reason to use the test for obviousness to
achieve indirectly what Congress could easily legislate directly
and has chosen not to enact. Therefore, the time of disclosure
would be the appropriate value for P when it is earlier than the
patent application filing date.
What of the reverse situation, where the patentee has filed
the patent application but has not publicly disclosed the
invention? As stated previously, the incentives of the patent
system are optimized when the entire consumer surplus before
an independent invention is counted as a social benefit. Perverse
incentives are not apparent: The patentee has opted out of the
potentially indefinite trade secret monopoly because the
invention will fall into the public domain when the patent
expires. Although there is a benefit to having the patentee
disclose the invention early for the progress of basic science, the
specific invention will remain under a de facto monopoly whether
or not there is disclosure.
197 If competitors have actual notice of the pending application, the patent
applicant may even be eligible for pre-issuance royalties upon patent issuance. See
35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(1).
198 1 am using the word "term" somewhat loosely here. Strictly speaking, the
patent "term" is the period of time between patent issuance-not filing-and
expiration. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). The patent expires at twenty years after filing.
Thus, the technical patent "term" is 20 years minus the time taken prosecuting the
patent. This term varies from patent to patent.
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A second look, however, reveals countervailing
considerations. There are at least three potential reasons why a
patentee may wish to keep the invention secret despite filing.
First, the cost of entry and exit in the market may be so low that
competitors will choose to enter the market even if they must exit
upon patent issuance. Thus, secrecy grants the patentee a
temporary monopoly before issuance. Second, the patentee may
conclude that it is more profitable to sue his rivals for
infringement rather than to exclude them from the market, and
secrecy encourages rivals to make sunk investments in an
infringing product in the period before patent issuance. Third,
the patentee can plausibly fear that his patent may be rejected
and wish to retain the option of keeping the invention as a trade
secret if no patent issues. 199
The first reason supports allowing the patentee to keep the
invention secret until issuance. Were the rule otherwise, the
patentee would be forced into a choice of either risking invalidity
due to nothing more than the patent office's delay, or disclosing
the application and compromising his exclusivity-effectively
shortening the patent term due to the patent office's delay. Both
options reduce the patentee's incentive for research.
The second reason is the modus operandi of so-called "patent
trolls."200 Because the recovery from an ex post infringement suit
can often exceed the royalty that is available through ex ante
licensing,20 1 a patentee can profit from accidental infringers who
unknowingly sink investments in a product that is patented. By
keeping the invention secret during the pendency of the patent
199 See Early Patent Publication: A Boon or Bane? A Discussion on the Legal and
Economic Effects of Publishing Patent Applications After Eighteen Months of Filing,
16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 601, 613-14 (1998) (statement of Robert Rines).
200 See supra text accompanying note 180.
201 This is because although patent infringement damages are calculated by
reference to a "reasonable royalty," the calculation is often deliberately inflated
above the level necessary to compensate the patentee. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v.
McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 980 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (calculating reasonable royalty by
considering the benefit to the infringer instead of the loss to the patentee). The
permanent injunction also permits an inflated royalty to be recovered. Lemley &
Shapiro, supra note 180, at 1991, 1996. The Supreme Court's recent decision in eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. gave district courts greater discretion to deny
injunctions. 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006). It remains to be seen whether this will
substantially affect the profitability and effectiveness of the troll strategy.
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application, 2 2 a patentee increases the chance that such
accidental infringement will transpire.
There is little positive that can be said about allowing the
patentee to keep his invention secret solely to lay a trap for the
unwary. It is unlikely, however, that an incentive for early
disclosure-by denying credit for consumer surplus generated
before disclosure-would do much to alleviate the problem. The
standard for a public disclosure in patent law is notoriously low,
and a patentee can make a public disclosure under this standard
with full confidence that an accidental infringer will never find
it.203 Even published patents are rarely read,20 4 and it is by no
means clear that articles disclosing inventions give notice that a
patent is forthcoming on the same invention. And if published
articles did have the effect of alerting readers to pending patents,
the most likely result is that potential infringers would cease
reading articles for fear of willful infringement liability, making
a disclosure requirement ineffective. 205
The third reason, that the patentee wishes to keep the
backup option of reverting to the trade secret system if the
patent is rejected, initially smacks of opportunism. Providing an
option of reverting to the trade secret system, however, is likely
beneficial. 206 Although a rejection of the patent indicates that
the invention did not create sufficient benefits to justify the cost
202 Upon the patent's issuance, of course, the invention will be published.
Sessions v. Romadka, 145 U.S. 29, 50 (1892) (noting that "all letters patent are
recorded, with their specifications, in the Patent Office, a record which is notice to
all the world"); see also Boyden v. Burke, 55 U.S. 575, 582 (1853) ("Patents are public
records. All persons are bound to take notice of their contents.").
203 In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899-900 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that a single
thesis in a university library is public disclosure); In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 227
(C.C.P.A. 1981) (holding that an Australian patent application kept only on
microfilm is public disclosure).
204 Douglas Lichtman, Substitutes for the Doctrine of Equivalents: A Response to
Meurer and Nard, 93 GEO. L.J. 2013, 2022-23 (2005) (noting that few patents are
ever actually read except in litigation or licensing); see also Timothy R. Holbrook,
Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 142-46 (2006) (outlining reasons
why potential infringers choose to remain rationally ignorant).
205 See Lemley & Tangri, supra note 176, at 1100-01. Alternatively, as Lemley
and Shapiro have suggested, in cases of a likely-invalid patent on a valuable
invention, the potential infringer may choose to deliberately infringe and then
litigate the patent or pay an inflated royalty, even with prior notice. See Lemley &
Shapiro, supra note 180, at 2003-05.
206 See supra Part 1V.C.
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of a patent, it may justify trade secret protection with lower
costs. By rejecting the patent, the incentives for the patent
system remain optimal even without disclosure.
In sum, the policy considerations generally favor defining P
as the earlier of filing or disclosure. While the policy of deterring
patent trolls gives some justification for a mandatory disclosure
requirement, it would be difficult to separate the patent trolls
from patentees who simply wished to have the option of reverting
to a trade secret in the event of a rejection. Without persuasive
evidence that a disclosure requirement would be effective against
patent trolls, mandatory disclosure would likely do more harm
than good. 20 7
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
The language of § 103 directs courts to consider "the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and
the prior art,"20 8 and codifies the standard as whether the
invention is "obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art."20 9 Given this standard, a
wholesale adoption of the test in Part III would be difficult to fit
within the statutory formulation. Nevertheless, several doctrinal
modifications are possible within the current statutory
framework to conform patentability to the overall interest of the
patent system in advancing long-term social welfare.
A. Invalidating Patents Based on Subsequent Independent
Invention
1. Doctrinal Basis for Considering Independent Invention
Prior to the Federal Circuit's formation, its predecessor, the
Court of Claims, had held that "[t]he fact of near-simultaneous
invention, though not determinative of statutory obviousness, is
strong evidence of what constitutes the level of ordinary skill in
207 One policy implication is that the publishing of pending patent applications
after 18 months may not be beneficial. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b). While publication
might provide notice to competitors (if competitors do not fear willful infringement
liability), it diminishes the incentives of patentees to enter the patent system in the
first place.
208 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
209 Id.
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the art."210 In one early decision, the Federal Circuit extended
this doctrine so that even subsequent independent invention, just
after the patentee, could be relevant to assessing obviousness. 211
Regional circuit decisions pre-dating the Federal Circuit's
exclusive jurisdiction had similarly placed weight on subsequent
independent invention.212
The relevance of independent invention was drastically
curtailed by the Federal Circuit's 1984 decision in Lindemann
Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co. 2 13 In
Lindemann, the district court invalidated a patent primarily on
the basis that "three individuals independently created the
designs which resulted in development" of the claimed
invention.214 The Federal Circuit was not impressed:
Because the statute, 35 U.S.C. § 135, (establishing and
governing interference practice) recognizes the possibility of
near simultaneous invention by two or more equally talented
inventors working independently, that occurrence may or may
not be an indication of obviousness when considered in light of
all the circumstances. In this instance, it clearly is not. Two of
the three individuals were ... the co-inventors listed on the '315
patent [the patent-in-suit]. The third was an Amhoist employee
210 Int'l Glass Co. v. United States, 408 F.2d 395, 405 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
211 In re Farrenkopf, 713 F.2d 714, 719-20 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[Independent
invention] occurred when the affiant would have had no motive to distort the truth
and at a time which was nearly contemporaneous with (just after) appellants'
reduction to practice."); see also Concrete Appliances Co. v. Gomery, 269 U.S. 177,
185 (1925).
The adaptation independently made by engineers and builders... and the
independent patent applications, within a comparatively short space of
time .... are in themselves persuasive evidence that this use, in
combination of well known mechanical elements was the product only of
ordinary mechanical or engineering skill ....
Id.
212 See, e.g., Fred Whitaker Co. v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 551 F.2d 622, 628
(5th Cir. 1977) ("There is also evidence that at least two of Whitaker's competitors,
Pharr and Rossville, actually did try using continuous filament yarn in similar
processes before learning about the Whitaker process and before the latter was
patented in December 1961."); Custom Paper Prods. Co. v. Atl. Paper Box Co., 469
F.2d 178, 180 (1st Cir. 1972) ("[T]he facts that [defendant] made its machine without
knowledge of Hincher, and did so in a relatively short time after it perceived a
demand for a flared strip, are not 'conclusive,' but on the matter of obviousness these
circumstances are not irrelevant." (citation omitted)).
213 730 F.2d 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
214 Id. at 1460.
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[the accused infringer] who claimed at trial to have proposed
the split ram in January of 1979, more than five years after the
invention was made by [plaintiff] Lindemann's assignors, nearly
three years after the '315 patent issued, and well after
Amhoist's employee Bleeland had in England observed and
photographed a Lindemann shear embodying the claimed
invention. Accepting, as we must, the district court's crediting
of the testimony respecting independent suggestion by an
Amhoist employee, that suggestion was simply too late to have
been relevant to a determination of whether the invention
would have been obvious at the time it was made .... 215
Although the Federal Circuit concluded with the statement
that independent invention "may or may not be an indication
of obviousness, '" 216 it soon became clear that subsequent
independent invention would rarely, if ever, become relevant to
the obviousness determination. 217 In the next year, the Federal
Circuit again held:
Development by others may also be pertinent to a
determination of the obviousness of an invention; but the
evidence presented was of activities occurring well after the
filing date of the '926 patent -application, and was not shown to
apply to the time the invention was made, as required by
35 U.S.C. § 103.218
Of course, independent invention that occurred prior to "the time
the invention was made" would already invalidate the patent
under 35 U.S.C. § 102, and thus independent invention ceased to
be an important consideration in obviousness determinations.
Moreover, at the same time, the Federal Circuit began to
insist upon a teaching, suggestion, or motivation as prerequisite
proof for a prima facie case of obviousness. 219  As such,
215 Id. at 1460-61 (citation omitted).
216 Id. at 1460.
217 Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1525, 1534 (2007) (citing Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies,
Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1380 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1986)) ("[T]he Federal Circuit has minimized
the significance of' subsequent independent invention.); see also Markey, supra note
133, at 337 (then-Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit expressing disapproval of giving
"undue evidentiary weight to the virtually simultaneous making of the invention by
more than one inventor").
218 Stewart-Warner Corp. v. City of Pontiac, 767 F.2d 1563, 1570 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (citations omitted).
219 See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 297
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independent invention would only be relevant after the prima
facie case had been successfully rebutted, when obviousness
would be judged on the totality of the circumstances. 220 A case
where the prima facie case was established, rebutted, and the
record contained relevant evidence of subsequent independent
invention was predictably rare.
The exception that illustrated the rule finally arose in the
2000 case Ecolochem, Inc. v. Southern California Edison Co. 22 1
In Ecolochem, the district court found that there was a sufficient
motivation to combine prior art references for one claim,222 and
the question considered by the Federal Circuit was whether the
prima facie case of obviousness had been rebutted by secondary
evidence. 223 Against the patentee's secondary evidence of non-
obviousness, the accused infringer submitted evidence of
subsequent independent invention, upon which the district court
relied. 224 The Federal Circuit recognized that "[e]ssentially, the
district court found that this secondary consideration factor
favors obviousness" 225 and affirmed with respect to the one claim
where the prima facie had dissolved. 226 At the same time,
however, the Federal Circuit reversed the finding of obviousness
with respect to other claims where it held there was no
motivation to combine, without considering the evidence of
independent invention.227
A rigid requirement of a teaching, suggestion, or motivation
in every case relegated independent invention to a fringe
doctrine. The Supreme Court in KSR, however, held that there
need not be a rigid adherence to this requirement in every case,
and in particular there is no need for a teaching to appear only in
published articles or published patents.228  Rather, "design
(Fed. Cir. 1985); ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
220 See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
221 227 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
222 Id. at 1364.
223 Id. at 1376.
224 Id. at 1379.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 1381.
227 Id. ("Given the absence of any proof of a motivation to combine, we hold that
the remaining claims were not proven obvious .... ).
228 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007).
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incentives and other market forces can prompt variations" in the
prior art.229 Consideration of subsequent independent invention
as a secondary factor would illustrate the real-life effects of such
design incentives and other market forces.
2. Independent Invention as a Secondary Consideration
As the prior section demonstrates, independent invention is
part of obviousness law, though its role has been largely
forgotten due to the Federal Circuit's emphasis on proving a
prima facie case of invalidity solely through prior teaching,
suggestion, or motivation. If independent invention is accorded
significant weight, the policy goals embodied in Equation 3 can
be accomplished in many cases without substantially revising
existing patent law. After all, if actual independent invention
were to occur within one year, the consumer surplus within the
first year would have to outweigh the monopoly cost in the 19
subsequent years to justify a patent, and such a lopsided benefit-
cost ratio is unlikely for most inventions. Thus, the mere fact of
independent invention within a short time of the patentee's
conception would suggest a high likelihood of invalidity, without
the necessity of delving into costs and benefits in many cases.
Independent invention, as defined in this Article, also
assuages the concerns expressed by the Federal Circuit in
Lindemann.230 Specifically, the Lindemann court articulated
three concerns: (1) the patent statute contemplates that rival
inventors could simultaneously invent, and establishes the
interference procedure when two patent applications claim the
same invention; (2) independent invention could be falsely
claimed, even after the accused infringer has observed and
photographed the patentee's product; and (3) independent
invention may occur many years after the patentee files for the
patent.231
229 Id. at 1740.
230 By excluding patent race competitors from the mix, it also differs from the
unmodified independent invention tests that have been proposed previously. See,
e.g., Steven P. Smith & Kurt R. Van Thomme, Bridge over Troubled Water: The
Supreme Court's New Patent Obviousness Standard in KSR Should Be Readily
Apparent and Benefit the Public, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 127, 204-08 (2007).
231 See Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 730
F.2d 1452, 1460-61 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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There is no inconsistency between the interference procedure
and independent invention as defined in this Article. The
interference procedure governs when a subsequent inventor files
a patent application for the invention.232  An independent
inventor, however, must not file a patent application. Indeed, to
qualify as an "independent invention" as defined in Part III.B,
the independent inventor must have demonstrably relinquished
the option of filing a patent-through measures such as
voluntarily creating a statutory bar to patenting-while
remaining ignorant of the patentee and the patentee's
disclosure.233
The possibility of false claims of independent invention is
overcome by the rigor of proof demanded. In Lindemann, the
Federal Circuit displayed obvious skepticism that the subsequent
invention was truly independent when the accused infringer had
observed and photographed the patentee's commercial product
embodying the claimed invention.23 4 Indeed, such a claim would
likely not meet the clear and convincing evidence standard
required to prove invalidity.235  A rule that requires actual
ignorance of the patentee and the patentee's disclosure is
probably inescapable. 236 As noted in Part LV.B.3, the difficulty of
demonstrating a negative-actual ignorance-can be overcome
by carefully documenting the sources of information received by
researchers and publication committees to show that the
conception and the decision to dedicate the invention to the
public domain were made while those involved had access to
neither the patentee's disclosure nor materials derivative of that
disclosure.
232 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (2000) ("Whenever an application is made for a patent
which, in the opinion of the Director, would interfere with any pending application,
or with any unexpired patent, an interference may be declared . .
233 See supra Part IV.B.3.
234 Lindemann, 730 F.2d at 1461.
235 See Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 1984). Even if the clear and convincing evidence rule is abandoned, see supra
note 153, it is worth noting that independent creation in copyright law faces the
same problem of verification, and yet independent creation of a copyrighted work
need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Positive Black
Talk, Inc. v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 372 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing
Granite Music Corp. v. United Artists Corp., 532 F.2d 718, 723-24 (9th Cir. 1976)).
236 See supra Part III.B.3.
20081
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Finally, the amount of time permissible between patentee
disclosure or filing, i.e., P, and independent invention, I, is a
matter of empirical research as to the typical distribution of
benefits and costs over the life of an invention. It would be
surprising, however, if many inventions accumulated sufficient
benefit in their first or second years to outweigh the cost of
eighteen or nineteen years of monopoly. On the other hand, the
question becomes much closer when five years of accumulated
consumer surplus is weighed against fifteen years of monopoly.
23 7
The dedication of the same invention to the public domain-
preferably with a foreclosure of the possibility of patent filing-
by a subsequent independent inventor, with clear and convincing
evidence that the subsequent inventor was ignorant of the
patentee the entire time, is evidence of actual independent
invention that can constitute an objective consideration described
by Graham.238  When such independent creation occurs
proximate in time to the patentee's own disclosure or filing-for
example, within one year-there is a strong likelihood that
society is paying more in monopoly costs than it could receive in
consumer surplus from the patent. As such, the patent should be
invalidated.
B. Reconsidering the Definition of "Prior Art"
Although section 103 prohibits patents on inventions that
are "obvious" in light of "the prior art," it does not define what
the prior art is. 239 The Federal Circuit and its predecessor have
defined the world of "prior art" by borrowing from select portions
of Section 102,240 resulting in "prior art" being defined by the
237 See, e.g., Lindemann, 730 F.2d at 1461. In actuality, Lindemann would have
involved balancing five years of consumer surplus (dating P from the time of patent
filing) against fourteen years of cost because the patent term at the time was
seventeen years from the date of issuance, and the purported independent invention
occurred nearly three years after issuance. Id.; see 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976).
238 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966) (stating that secondary
"indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness" may be relevant); see Ecolochem, Inc. v. S.
Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
239 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
240 See In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1290 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (defining section 103
prior art as prior art under sections 102(a), (b), (e), and (g)); see also OddzOn Prods.,
Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1403-04 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (extending prior art
to include section 102(f)).
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earlier of the patentee's conception or one year prior to the filing
date. Events subsequent to this critical date are essentially
irrelevant to the obviousness inquiry.241 At the same time,
almost every patent and printed publication that is published
before the critical date is considered "prior art," with the
exception that printed publications that do not meet a minimal
threshold of public accessibility are excluded. 242
The classification as prior art of all public knowledge prior to
the date of conception raises the possibility of wrongful rejections
for the patentee. As demonstrated in Part III.B.2, a losing
competitor who subsequently publishes the results of his
research is not truly an "independent inventor," because this type
of strategic behavior by a rival confers no favors on the public in
the long-term. Invalidating the patent because of a subsequent
disclosure by a rival who lost the patent race destroys patent
incentives because firms can predict ex ante that multiple rivals
are likely to finish close to them in the quest for a patent. If such
a close finish between patent-seeking rivals means no patent
issues to the winner, then no one will enter the race to begin
with, and the patent incentive loses its force.
This intuition applies equally to disclosures prior to the
patentee's conception. Research, by its nature, tends to be
incremental, and incremental steps in isolation appear to be
obvious. To take a simple example, if the research objective is a
car that has a fuel economy of 100 miles per gallon ("mpg"),
research breakthroughs might occur in one mpg increments, with
each one mpg increment appearing "obvious."243  Thus, the
patentee's 100 mpg car would be "obvious" because a rival
241 See Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293,
1321, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (rejecting reliance on a subsequent patent application
filed two months after the invention date); Stewart-Warner Corp. v. City of Pontiac,
767 F.2d 1563, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding the trial court's consideration of
subsequent developments improper).
242 See In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1160-61 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
243 Here, of course, I am using the word "obvious" in the common sense of the
term, reflecting the obviousness test as currently interpreted. Thus, a one mpg
difference between the prior art 99 mpg car (prior art encompassing everything
before patentee conception) and the patentee's 100 mpg car would likely not be seen
as sufficiently large to justify a patent. Applying the equation of Part III, of course,
would require additional information about the benefits, costs, and time necessary to
independently achieve the one mpg increase-not to mention the fact that a rival's
prior publication would not be independent of the patent system's incentives.
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created a 99 mpg car before the patentee, and the rival's 99 mpg
car would have been "obvious" because another rival had created
a 98 mpg car even earlier, and so on. The problem then is that
no patent will ever issue on the 100 mpg car even if,
cumulatively, the successive breakthroughs allow us to progress
from 20 mpg to 100 mpg. Multiple rival firms racing for a 100
mpg car, publishing their interim findings, will preempt each
other and make the patent ultimately unavailable. 244 This harms
the patent system because mutual preemption is a predictable
result of patent racing, and patent racing is inevitable for
valuable patents. The result is that nobody will make the
investment in researching a 100 mpg car-at least not at the
optimal level that the patent system is designed to induce. In a
world where rivals race for patents, the ultimate patent survives
this preemption gauntlet and remains available only when:
(1) researchers do not publish their interim findings; or (2) there
is a single, sudden large breakthrough that itself crosses a
"nonobviousness" threshold. The first runs contrary to the
purpose of patent laws in encouraging scientific disclosure and is
unrealistic to expect in patent racing contexts where a losing
firm has the strategic imperative to publish and preempt the
patent. 245  The second-requiring a single, sudden large
breakthrough for patentability-is to restore the reviled "flash of
genius" test in all but name. 246
This concern is not merely theoretical. A recent Federal
Circuit case, PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc.,
247
illustrates the phenomenon, and a dissenting judge accused the
court of restoring the "flash of genius" test.248 In PharmaStem,
accumulated research had created a suspicion "that umbilical
244 See Parchomovsky, supra note 124, at 928. Parchomovsky considered the
social welfare effects of this phenomenon to be ambiguous. See id. at 944-46.
245 Id. at 929 ("A firm will choose to publish its research results whenever it
believes-correctly or incorrectly-that its competitors are likely to beat it to the
patent application."). Parchomovsky raises the possibility that rival firms may agree
to not preempt each other through bargaining. See id. at 948-49. This type of
horizontal collusion between rivals, however, raises severe antitrust problems. See
supra note 126.
246 See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
247 491 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
248 See id. at 1377-78 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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cord blood is capable of hematopoietic reconstitution,"249 but the
patentees were the first to achieve the result. 250 The Federal
Circuit nonetheless held that the invention was not patentable
because "the inventors merely used routine research methods to
prove what was already believed to be the case."251  The
relegation of "routine research" to non-inventive and non-
patentable status, of course, was the precise problem with
Cuno252 and the "flash of genius" test.
253
The solution in cases of prior disclosure is not different from
subsequent disclosure: A strategic disclosure by patent-seeking
rivals designed to invalidate a patent should not be considered
prior art for obviousness purposes. 25 4 To do otherwise leaves
firms at the risk that no patent will issue in the end-due to
mutual preemption-forfeiting the firms' research investment
and deterring the ex ante investment that patents are designed
to induce.255
249 Id. at 1363 (majority opinion).
250 See id.
251 Id.
252 Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
253 See supra text accompanying note 27. It is also unclear whether an unproven
hypothesis would be patentable. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 531 (1966)
(rejecting the proposition that "any process is 'useful' within the meaning of
[35 U.S.C. §] 101 if it produces a compound whose potential usefulness is under
investigation by serious scientific researchers"). But see Burroughs Wellcome Co. v.
Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating that inventors do not
need to know that an invention would work to conceive it). The cumulative result
may be that a great deal of scientific research falls into a twilight zone where the
hypothesis is not patentable (because it is only "under investigation"), and the proof
is not patentable (because it is "routine research").
254 A related, and more difficult, question is whether the publication should
qualify as anticipation prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102. The difference is that a § 102
disclosure must disclose the patentee's subsequent invention exactly. A disclosing
party making a strategic disclosure will create a § 102 rejection only if the disclosing
party makes a strategic miscalculation: A § 102 disclosure means that the disclosing
party in fact invented a fully patentable invention, i.e., contrary to its own belief, the
disclosing party in fact won the patent race but then forfeited the results. It would
be unlikely to diminish patent incentives greatly for society to take advantage only
when firms commit strategic blunders of this type: The patentee loses nothing-if its
rival had not committed the blunder, the rival would have received the patent-and
the rival cannot complain since it deliberately, if mistakenly, forfeited the patent.
255 See supra Part III.B.2. But cf. Parchomovsky, supra note 124, at 944-46
(arguing that early strategic disclosure by a losing rival to preempt a later patent
may enhance social welfare by freeing access to basic research and expanding the
network of users for an invention). Parchomovsky nonetheless recognizes that
strategic disclosure by rivals may, in some situations, diminish patent incentives. Id.
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The analysis differs, -however, between pre-conception
patents and pre-conception publications. Unlike the post-
conception scenario where a disclosure in a patent should never
be considered as an independent invention, disclosures in a
patent prior to the patentee should be considered prior art. This
is because the prospect of an early and broad patent right that
preempts later patents does not diminish incentives for
research-it increases them. 256  The increased patent racing
incentive has beneficial effects for society.257
The interpretation of "prior art" under section 103258 should
be modified such that a printed publication is not prior art if it
was produced by a patent-racing rival to preempt a later patent
by a competitor. 259
CONCLUSION
The traditional approach to patentability has been to
compare the patented invention to the prior art, and to ask
whether the differences were sufficiently material to be
patentable. This requirement has been variously described as
asking whether the differences (and solutions for bridging the
differences) were "inventive," "ingenious,' ".obvious," "taught,"
"suggested," or "motivated." Except where the prior art was
required to explicitly describe the invention such that there were
no differences, all of these tests were nothing more than semantic
variations of essentially the same subjective inquiry. Objective
science can describe the difference between a metal doorknob and
a clay doorknob down to the last atom, but it will never be able to
determine if substituting a metal doorknob with a clay doorknob
is "obvious."
The key to reframing the obviousness inquiry is to realize
that the goal of patents is not to encourage invention in the
at 944.
256 See Kitch, supra note 90, at 276-80; McFetridge & Smith, supra note 100, at
198-201.
257 See Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, supra note 102, at 467.
258 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
259 Congress has previously stepped in to overrule the Federal Circuit's
interpretation of "prior art" in section 103. Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 103(c)(2),
excluding from obviousness prior art the non-public research of joint researchers, to
partly overrule the Federal Circuit's decision in OddzOn Products, 122 F.3d 1396
(1997). See H.R. REP. No. 108-425, at 2, 4-5 (2004).
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abstract, but to encourage innovations that create more benefit to
society than the cost of a patent. Whether the patent creates
more benefits than costs depends on what the alternative is-
whether, if the patent were not available from the very
beginning, society would nonetheless have received the same
invention. More precisely, because virtually every invention will
eventually be independently created without a patent, the
inquiry is when society would have received the same invention
had a patent never been available. Before such independent
invention would have offered the same invention to society, the
patent reward creates benefits in the form of consumer surplus.
After the time of such independent invention, the patent exacts
monopoly costs in the form of deadweight loss and dissipated
surplus.
Determining when independent invention would have
occurred, however, is a tricky inquiry because it must reconstruct
a hypothetical world that entirely removes the incentives of the
patent reward. If the patent had never been available, rival
inventors in the patent race would not exist, and competitors
holding trade secrets would not disclose them to preempt future
patents. Removing these influences from the determination
results in the requirements that an independent invention must
be independent of the patentee, independent of the patent
system, and result in a dedication of the invention to the public
domain.
This Article redefines the patentability standard, offering
determinable criteria for courts to determine whether the
availability of a patent for an invention creates more consumer
benefit than the patent exacts in monopoly costs. Because
patents are ultimately offered for the purpose of enhancing
overall social welfare, the obviousness standard should be
reconsidered to incorporate these economic calculations. Even
without a change in the statute, however, many of the economic
policy objectives can be incorporated through greater
consideration of independent invention as a secondary
consideration, reinvigorating a dormant doctrine that courts have
overlooked and underutilized.
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